Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sat, 30 July 2016 12:14 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2016 13:14:14 +0100
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Cc: Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>, privsec-program@iab.org, spud <spud@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks
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Hiya,

I agree with your conclusion that we seem to have clearly set out
where we disagree without so far changing one another's conclusions.
So I only have one more thing to add for now, which is about the
form of, and not the content of, the discussion. You said:

On 30/07/16 12:07, Mirja Kühlewind wrote:
> Enabling large scale encryption that is deployable is the goal of
> PLUS. And this enables two things: increased security and privacy, as
> well as transport evolution. For the first goal we need encryption
> and maintain the status quo (regarding network manageability), while
> for the second part, we envision the development and use of new
> transports that enable new services. Not having a tool to also enable
> some innovation in the network to support these services, archives
> the goal only half way.

I'm fine with and fully accept the first sentence.

The rest of that paragraph however seems to me to beg the question,
that is, it assumes that a deployed PLUS-solution will be an overall
good, when it is exactly that that I and others wish to question. I
do think this is an issue in this discussion and was in the BoF - the
proponents, being convinced that the solution is needed, assume that
the solution is needed when answering those who are questioning
whether we'd be better or worse off should PLUS be developed further.

That's probably natural given folks have been working on SPUD/PLUS
for some time, but it seems to me to hinder discussion with folks like
me who are far from convinced that the envisaged solution is at all
desirable. So my apologies for trying to drag you back to what you
likely consider first principles you probably figured were done with
a couple of years ago, but I think that's actually fair and to be
expected when one has a BoF of this kind.

Cheers,
S.


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