Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sun, 31 July 2016 20:22 UTC

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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>, Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>, spud <spud@ietf.org>, "privsec-program@iab.org" <privsec-program@iab.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks
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On 31/07/16 21:10, Christian Huitema wrote:
> First of all, this is an interesting piece of information, and I
> would like to thank Brian for writing it down. Whether we believe
> that additional shim headers are wise or not, we should certainly
> look at current privacy threats against TCP and IP, and as much as
> possible deploy mitigations.

In case my verbosity in this thread has obscured it... I do agree
with the above.

S.