Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Mon, 01 August 2016 06:34 UTC

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To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>, Stephan Neuhaus <sten@artdecode.de>
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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 08:34:00 +0200
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Cc: Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>, spud <spud@ietf.org>, =?UTF-8?Q?Mirja_K=c3=bchlewind?= <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks
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On 7/30/16 9:59 PM, Tom Herbert wrote:
>
> No, it's not. In fact, exposing flow start/stop information is a good
> example of something that facilitates intrusiveness by middleboxes at
> the transport layer.
>
> The purpose of exposing this information is to allow network devices
> to track connections, but connection tracking in the network is
> fundamentally flawed since there is no requirement that all packets of
> a connection go any single network device (i.e. the Internet is packet
> switched not circuit switched).

Except that I will bet you that over 99.999% of connections do, and that
this is particularly sufficient for home routers.

Eliot