Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks

Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com> Mon, 01 August 2016 21:02 UTC

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From: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>
To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Thread-Topic: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks
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Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 21:02:51 +0000
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Cc: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, spud <spud@ietf.org>, =?utf-8?B?TWlyamEgS8O8aGxld2luZA==?= <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>, Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>, Stephan Neuhaus <sten@artdecode.de>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks
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On Monday, August 1, 2016 1:52 PM, Tom Herbert wrote:
>
> The question is also whether we need to send an explicit "end
> connection" signal. Network devices want this to know when to free
> their connection tracking state, but in a multipath Internet I don't
> readily how this would be a useful signal either.

The concern about the "end" signals is potential misuse -- something similar to spoofing TCP RST -- think "man on the side" attacks. The spoofed packets will not fool the endpoint, but they can cause intermediate systems to drop state, and effectively force an ongoing connection to stop. Any design would have to somehow mitigate this spoofing attack.

-- Christian Huitema