Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Mon, 01 August 2016 10:28 UTC

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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>, Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>, spud <spud@ietf.org>, "privsec-program@iab.org" <privsec-program@iab.org>
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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 12:28:40 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Spud] [Privsec-program] Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks
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Hi Christian,


On 7/31/16 10:10 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> The draft mentions the IPv6 flow-ID, but creative intermediaries might
> also manipulate the TOS fields, so maybe there should be a subsection
> describing that too.

Just so that we're clear, the TOS fields, and in particular DHCP were
designed so that they could be overwritten (mostly erased), as required,
by intermediaries.

Eliot