Return-Path: <pkixssh@roumenpetrov.info>
X-Original-To: ssh@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ssh@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3FDC0E5E412D
	for <ssh@mail2.ietf.org>; Wed, 29 Apr 2026 11:23:56 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1;
	t=1777487036; bh=bf+KCGJSgBntMD3cXGWJOss+UbzNamwD/tcJ+oOBEw8=;
	h=Date:From:Subject:To:Cc:References:In-Reply-To;
	b=eomj2TXLZ+Z7+NXlHOF6bhplUbqugx14r8KE8yx+XR9JNDnbcNzUD8RxzYvZJ6d9/
	 VMKN7mWyWm6Sx++NqlZw1n/3fcCRLY46ftbzYUNWjOrIwHu6eaC3k7VOQ7Kn9gUl46
	 j0bnh5gbHyBT7/3LtNzUlDDK/wPqn7RPmdTtMGwA=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.798
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.798 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1,
	DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7,
	RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_CERTIFIED_BLOCKED=0.001,
	RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001]
	autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key)
	header.d=roumenpetrov.info
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31])
	by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id TQsYDeUA0IHM for <ssh@mail2.ietf.org>;
	Wed, 29 Apr 2026 11:23:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rila.superhosting.bg (rila.superhosting.bg [91.196.125.212])
	(using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
	 key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256)
	(No client certificate requested)
	by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2BBFE5E4125
	for <ssh@ietf.org>; Wed, 29 Apr 2026 11:23:55 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed;
	d=roumenpetrov.info; s=default; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:
	In-Reply-To:References:Cc:To:Subject:From:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID:Sender
	:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From:
	Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Id:List-Help:
	List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive;
	bh=Aj2Ws7qGQhgQt6qNpaOpJM8hMGpZ9l1DAtREqHpf8cQ=; b=gUtuDN++fbXa+xZhwvwj3oCOcr
	08vPaEhVU48zXXU8zGzg3mkyBawL5Gv5awrtKLzKyvRMQvNnqqhqLcZmaOrw5mQUcnBf5vVmTJTfH
	COxNKjrbaXXS3qCfvLmMZE57KK8AcJIkVZOiNlI6wspVLAsPiNG8jizPfWozA6RXgcJEhw54ajSMY
	0CBs+2IPmvqZ61tsuvNrXYB8zfLB7dqSBXJlICc7Ww4joqaF+kG3XYNoA0NXvzdjPFBoYE5WYmco9
	l2jNGjItz060FALYOACZSMiIckUxkvp07qurGvhCUYYmu+z+0vMguG2c7Wl5tBDFHMkEoCeM7ReVM
	1R4D1PKg==;
Received: from [46.232.157.251] (port=62846 helo=[192.168.1.11])
	by rila.superhosting.bg with esmtpsa  (TLS1.3) tls TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
	(Exim 4.99.1)
	(envelope-from <pkixssh@roumenpetrov.info>)
	id 1wI9Zg-00000009I62-0iZE;
	Wed, 29 Apr 2026 21:23:54 +0300
Message-ID: <545a67be-231a-43f9-bcd5-2643ab9b2fb9@roumenpetrov.info>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 21:23:51 +0300
MIME-Version: 1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird
From: Roumen Petrov <pkixssh@roumenpetrov.info>
To: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>,
 "Appel, Ryan" <ryan.appel=40bofa.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
References: <f1964c88-5199-48f7-a23d-36c0328734c8@cs.tcd.ie>
 <CAFR824zaY1QzWSnT2z=SeFu5-QVzzOqMbuHXcnPU5wMsF+-pug@mail.gmail.com>
 <c5ca13e1845d433d817442d722098e7d@bofa.com>
 <aadd19c7-d4bf-424c-bf8e-e809f8997a6c@roumenpetrov.info>
 <0b1d30dc175441e1a7bd70bdd0aea7ae@bofa.com>
 <0754a308ce6f39193b9570b6ba4f62a8@ucc.asn.au>
Content-Language: en-GB
In-Reply-To: <0754a308ce6f39193b9570b6ba4f62a8@ucc.asn.au>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse,
 please include it with any abuse report
X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - rila.superhosting.bg
X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - ietf.org
X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12]
X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - roumenpetrov.info
X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: rila.superhosting.bg: authenticated_id:
 master78@roumenpetrov.info
X-Authenticated-Sender: rila.superhosting.bg: master78@roumenpetrov.info
X-Source: 
X-Source-Args: 
X-Source-Dir: 
Message-ID-Hash: 7EFORV656VRBVD5GVGXLKT63ZTPLKUZQ
X-Message-ID-Hash: 7EFORV656VRBVD5GVGXLKT63ZTPLKUZQ
X-MailFrom: pkixssh@roumenpetrov.info
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency;
 loop; banned-address; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia;
 implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject;
 digests; suspicious-header
CC: ssh@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: =?utf-8?q?=5BSsh=5D_Re=3A_PQ_signatures_-_where_do_we_want_to_end_up=3F?=
List-Id: "The SSH mail list will allow discussions on improving aspects of the
 Secure Shell (SSH) protocol." <ssh.ietf.org>
Archived-At: 
 <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ssh/NB2b4qbQschrLUpfNMo1EkWVrmQ>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ssh>
List-Help: <mailto:ssh-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:ssh-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:ssh@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:ssh-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ssh-leave@ietf.org>

Hello Matt and Ryan,

На 29.04.26 г. в 4:31, Matt Johnston написа:
> On 2026-04-29 1:46 am, Appel, Ryan wrote:
>> Hey Roumen,
>>
>> I don't believe it needs to be specified either.
>>
>> OpenSSH and Putty for example have completely different ways of
>> representing key files (which is obviously different than pkixssh
>> which uses certificates), and specifying a specific way to store the
>> key (either in expanded / seed form) is likely unnecessary. This is my
>> perspective, I just wanted to gather consensus.

FYI: PKIX-SSH could convert between PKCS#8(standard)(*) format and OpenSSH proprietary format i.e. to use both.


> 
> In the case of OpenSSH and Putty key files, it's possible to convert between formats, the underlying key components are the same.
> For server keys in particular it's desirable to keep stable host keys, even if switching software implementations.
> 
> If only the expanded ML-DSA key is stored by an implementation, that can't be converted to other implementations that expect a seed.
> That would be a change to behaviour SSH users expect with key files.


This is my point for ML_DSA and etc keys: (1)private+public vs (2)seed+private(secret) vs etc.(3) in PKCS#8(*) format.
Some cryptographic implementation use (1), other use (2), (3) or both (1)+(2).

I think that specification must specify how is stored private part.
Is there a reason for a hardware token to follow non-related specification?

The same for file-based store. For instance, I don't care how a wallet stores and protect keys.

Only specification for a cryptographic module may specify how is stored private part. Note that it could be non-exportable.
All other specifications must be considered flawed.


[SNIP]

Regards,
Roumen Petrov

