[Stackevo] Optional Security is Not
"Brian Trammell (IETF)" <ietf@trammell.ch> Mon, 14 January 2019 14:43 UTC
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From: "Brian Trammell (IETF)" <ietf@trammell.ch>
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Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:43:41 +0100
To: Stackevo <stackevo@iab.org>
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Subject: [Stackevo] Optional Security is Not
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Hi, all, I've recently dusted off and updated a draft about an idea I've been tossing around for a while (first rev, IIRC, was written back in London): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-trammell-optional-security-not/ -- thanks to Martin for comments on this (last summer!). To some extent, this is shaping up to be a companion to RFC 8170. While the former takes a comprehensive look at protocol transitions, this looks at a particular impediment (the base-rate fallacy) to particular protocol transitions (optional security for routing, naming, and end-to-end transport, at least for the web), and attempts to derive guidelines for moving forward (tl;dr pay people to do stuff you want them to when natural incentives aren't enough, and coordinate action when you have to "break" things.) Comments, including what (if anything) I should do with this document, much appreciated! Thanks, cheers, Brian
- [Stackevo] Optional Security is Not Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: [Stackevo] Optional Security is Not Spencer Dawkins at IETF