Re: [stir] [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling

[Richard Shockey <[e-mail]>]

 

+1   ☺  

 

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Richard Shockey

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From: stir <[e-mail]> on behalf of Henning Schulzrinne <[e-mail]>
Date: Saturday, March 17, 2018 at 5:08 PM
To: Steve Atkins <[e-mail]>
Cc: Applications and Real-Time Area Discussion <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: [stir] [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling

 

I admit that I'm less than thrilled with having VoIP add to global warming. Is that really what we want to accomplish, just as other blockchain-like systems are getting, rightfully, dinged for that?

 

We have to consider that the most likely parties affected will be legitimate mass callers, e.g., for emergency notifications or appointment reminders, increasing their costs for no particularly good reason. As long as this isn't universal, the bad guys will simply avoid such destinations. (They don't seem to be focusing on the PBX market anyway - they may suspect that corporate offices are not promising target markets for cruise deals and credit repair pitches.)

 

Henning

 

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 4:49 PM, Steve Atkins <[e-mail]> wrote:


> On Mar 17, 2018, at 10:58 AM, Ted Hardie <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hi Jonathan, Cullen,
>
> I was somewhat surprised that the draft did not have a direct reference to the SIP Hashcash work (especially since Cullen was the author of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06).  From my perspective at least, it still looks to be a useful historical antecedent to consult, since it is a proof-of-work system (and one on which a bunch of later cryptocurrencies draw).  In particular, its view that this is about a demonstration of work rather than a payment to send may still be a valuable perspective.
>
> http://www.hashcash.org/ still appears to be up, by the way, for folks that want to see how its original use case tied into thwarting denial of service attacks.

I hope someone is soliciting input from the email community, who went through this process a decade or so ago and noted that bad actors have much, much cheaper access to CPU for proof-of-work than good actors do.

Cheers,
  Steve
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