Re: [stir] Comments on draft-ietf-stir-certificates-09
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 23 March 2017 23:21 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 16:20:28 -0700
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Subject: Re: [stir] Comments on draft-ietf-stir-certificates-09
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> > You don't define the semantics of TelephoneNumberRange. This seems > like it's potentially subtle. The natural design seems like you > would interpret start as if it were an integer and then allow > everything in the range [start, start + count ). However, aren't > there edge cases here. Consider the field that contains: > > { +1.999.999.9999, 2 } // punctuation added for clarity. > > Clearly, +1.999.999.9999 is permitted, but are there any other > numbers permitted? My algorithm above would include > +2.000.000.0000, but that's clearly not right. Does it wrap > so that it includes +1.000.000.0000? Seems like some text > is required here. > In reading -12, this does not seem to be adjusted :) -Ekr > > S 10. > The tradeoff between short lived certificates and using status > information is that the former’s burden is on the front end (i.e., > enrollment) and the latter’s burden is on the back end (i.e., > verification). Both impact call setup time, but it is assumed that > generating a short-lived certificate for each call, and consequently > performing enrollment for each call, is more of an impact than > acquiring status information. > > This seems to confuse enrollment with certificate issuance. However, > at least in protocols like ACME, that's not correct: you enroll > once and then you can get as many certs issued as you want within > a time window. It's not clear why this would be a bigger issue > than OCSP, and there are obvious latency advantages because you > can get a new cert at the start of dialing (i.e., before the > destination number is known). > > You are also ignoring the possibility of OCSP stapling, which > would seem to resolve both concerns. It seems like it would > be good to specify this mode. > > > S 10.2. > The requirement to consult OCSP in real time results in a network > round-trip time of day, > > Should this say "delay"? > > > S 10.2.1. > Am I supposed to be getting here that you are importing a bunch of > the HVE requirements, but you don't want to directly refer to HVE > because of the requirement to not use per-request extensions. Is > that right? If so, maybe it would be better to normatively reference > the spec and then override it. > > > S 10.3. > How does the mechanism described in this section interact with TN > lists that are in the cert? Or do you only use it if you have the > spid form? > >
- [stir] Comments on draft-ietf-stir-certificates-09 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [stir] Comments on draft-ietf-stir-certificat… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [stir] Comments on draft-ietf-stir-certificat… Drage, Keith (Nokia - GB)
- [stir] Considering alternatives Tony Rutkowski