[stir] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-stir-certificates-11: (with COMMENT)

["Kathleen Moriarty" <[e-mail]>]

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-stir-certificates-11: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Introduction: nit,
   Robocallers use impersonation as a means
   of obscuring identity; while robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN,
   block (that is, withhold) their caller identity, callees are less
   likely to pick up calls from blocked identities, and therefore
   appearing to calling from some number, any number, is preferable.

s/appearing to calling/appearing to call/

Section 10.2.1:
I'm wondering why SHA-1 is described as follows instaed of
discouraged/not allowed ...
o  There is no requirement to support SHA-1, RSA with SHA-1, or DSA
      with SHA-1.

I don't see any references to RFCs that update RFC5280, like RFC6818.  It
would be good to include these when 5280 is used for revocation methods
mentioned.  6818 is for CRLs.