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Re: [stir] [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling

Steve Atkins <steve@wordtothewise.com> Sat, 17 March 2018 20:49 UTC

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From: Steve Atkins <steve@wordtothewise.com>
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Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2018 13:49:13 -0700
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Subject: Re: [stir] [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling
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> On Mar 17, 2018, at 10:58 AM, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Jonathan, Cullen,
> 
> I was somewhat surprised that the draft did not have a direct reference to the SIP Hashcash work (especially since Cullen was the author of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06).  From my perspective at least, it still looks to be a useful historical antecedent to consult, since it is a proof-of-work system (and one on which a bunch of later cryptocurrencies draw).  In particular, its view that this is about a demonstration of work rather than a payment to send may still be a valuable perspective. 
> 
> http://www.hashcash.org/ still appears to be up, by the way, for folks that want to see how its original use case tied into thwarting denial of service attacks.

I hope someone is soliciting input from the email community, who went through this process a decade or so ago and noted that bad actors have much, much cheaper access to CPU for proof-of-work than good actors do.

Cheers,
  Steve

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