Re: [stir] Draft minutes from the 2019-Sep-20 Stir Virtual Interim
Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Tue, 24 September 2019 15:35 UTC
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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 10:35:13 -0500
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To: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [stir] Draft minutes from the 2019-Sep-20 Stir Virtual Interim
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I assume this is my typo: s/ "Is third-party RCS evil” / "Is third-party RCD evil" Ben. > On Sep 24, 2019, at 9:06 AM, Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> wrote: > > The draft minutes are available at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2019-stir-01/materials/minutes-interim-2019-stir-01-201909201000> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2019-stir-01/materials/minutes-interim-2019-stir-01-201909201000> (and copied below for your convenience). > > Please send any necessary corrections to the list or the chairs. > > The recording is at <https://ietf.webex.com/recordingservice/sites/ietf/recording/playback/9bfb52eeb4334ea2b5226811474ff8a4> <https://ietf.webex.com/recordingservice/sites/ietf/recording/playback/9bfb52eeb4334ea2b5226811474ff8a4> > RjS > > ---- > > Minutes: STIR Virtual Interim September 20, 2019 > > == Attendees == > > Adam Roach, Andrew Gallant, Arleen Elliot, Ben Campbell, Bopsi Chandramouli, > Chris Wendt, Eric Burger, Hala Mowafy, Jon Peterson, Kevin Cassidy, Martin > Dolly, Mary Barnes, Michael Richardson, Mike Hamilton, Rich Salz, Rifaat > Shekh-Yusef, Robert Sparks, Russ Housley, Sathvik Prasad, Vijay Gurbani > > == Agenda == > > Close open issues on: > > draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-04 > draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation-00 > > == draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-04 == > > Chris presented updates in version 04. > > Question: Should call-info/RCD be used together for the two main cases? > > 1: Post-validation: Extract out identity headers towards UE (e.g. eCNAM) > 2: compact-form (canonicalization from display-name and call-info) - needs > further definition > > Conclusions: Align the RCD with call-info. Use call-inf as a mechanism to > define compact-form. Future extensions to call-info may need to align with RCD. > Need to make sure this really works—may need a separate “stub” draft. > > > Discussion: issues related to URL nesting in RCD. Issues include the > possibility of intentional abuse, the need for any vetting authority to verify > nested URIs, and the need to put reasonable limits on nesting. > > Conclusions: The draft should guidance for the use of referenced content in > RCD, including the use of nested references. There are a number of > considerations here; the group needs some proposed text to discuss. > > Discussion: Should the use of the “rcdi” mechanism should be normatively > required? > > Conclusions: “MUST” use rcdi if the RCD includes referenced content (i.e. > Links). “MAY” use otherwise. > > Discussion: Do we need 3 digest algorithms? Current algorithms align with existing passport signature algorithms. > > Conclusions: Keep as is (i.e. keep the 3 algorithms) > > Discussion: “icn” key vs using “logo” in a jcard. > > Conclusions: Favor the jCard usage. jCard is more expressive than the “icn” > key about the originator’s intent. jCard gives a better chance of having both > the sender and recipient interpret the content in the same context. We should > align with jCard as main mechanism for both RCD and call-info, but need to have > discussion in both areas to come to consensus. > > Discussion: Is third-party RCS evil? > > Conclusions: Not necessarily. There are reasonable use cases for third part > RCD. These may provide migration paths since not all call originators will be > able to sign their own RCD passports on day 1. > > Discussion: Privacy Considerations. > > Conclusions: The privacy considerations for RCD are mostly similar to those for > SIP headers. The same privacy mechanism should apply to RCD as the rest of the > SIP message. The main difference is the use of referenced content. The draft > should include privacy considerations related to referenced content. > > > == draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation == > > Discussion: Should this work continue, given the controversy in other industry > groups about the best way to handle enterprise caller use cases? > > Conclusions: Continue to progress the work. Industry likely to use multiple > solutions in parallel. Treat this as a tool in the toolbox that other groups > can use (or not) as they wish. > > > Discussion: How do OCN and tn blocks interact? > > Conclusions: Typically parent cert contains the OCN and the child cert has TN > blocks, in which case the parent OCN constrains the childTN blocks. If a single > cert has both OCN and TN blocks, they are additive, that is, the OCN does not > constrains the TNs. This may need further discussion/clarification, as people > not involved in the discussion may have different interpretations. > > > > _______________________________________________ > stir mailing list > stir@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/stir
- [stir] Draft minutes from the 2019-Sep-20 Stir Vi… Robert Sparks
- Re: [stir] Draft minutes from the 2019-Sep-20 Sti… Ben Campbell