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Re: [stir] Choice of STIR signature algorithm

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 18 May 2016 21:59 UTC

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References: <D32953D1.4770F%john.mattsson@ericsson.com> <1A843300-AEB7-4EC6-8256-C88F6847B82E@neustar.biz> <D329995E.477D9%john.mattsson@ericsson.com> <A3723DBB-476C-4F22-95E0-37AE0872FBBD@shockey.us> <F4F09888-780B-4725-9A74-AD2EF661C5C0@vigilsec.com> <0DD82221-E79D-4F15-B2B5-93165EC98919@shockey.us> <570534D4.6010707@nostrum.com> <5195FEBC-8395-4E77-B768-2B2D81144121@shockey.us> <56DF2D20-9381-45CB-8057-6B1AB99B05E9@chriswendt.net> <BB4B8171-BF3E-4D3F-B81B-73AC9768ED75@shockey.us> <D3316C0C.485E4%john.mattsson@ericsson.com> <2EC06927-2614-491E-A499-C86ABB30573C@chriswendt.net> <26AE9662-B919-4B22-AFF8-45CF351AA03F@vigilsec.com> <2C466A8A-D638-49AE-9698-699D67762FF1@standardstrack.com> <EED4C512-B57C-47EC-9CE4-07C64365D246@vigilsec.com> <CABcZeBN3OLiaea10cWrtyv6R9KxHHVMuAsC56o=xmj6MWn_RYg@mail.gmail.com> <AA4D2199-3A8D-4015-86F3-DEE04120E51C@vigilsec.com> <CABcZeBPSLDeSLRgAyBqCR_K_-=F6Fck+CBZ1rSnLj7CNpDrGAA@mail.gmail.com> <D07F290C-CF3B-4462-945F-DD45AC278847@att.com>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 14:58:46 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBPD1vYD_TamA2kJH7WH3PKMVM2v3kD34h4My4bkyXMdbw@mail.gmail.com>
To: "DOLLY, MARTIN C" <md3135@att.com>
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Cc: IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: [stir] Choice of STIR signature algorithm
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Why would P-384 be a logical next step?

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 8:50 PM, DOLLY, MARTIN C <md3135@att.com> wrote:

> Eric
>
> Why less is more?
>
> If we are not forward thinking (directionally), it will make it harder to
> take the next step
>
> Thanks
>
> Martin C Dolly
> Lead Member of Technical Staff
> Core & Government/Regulatory Standards
> AT&T
> Cell: 609-903-3360
> Email: md3135@att.com
>
> On May 16, 2016, at 11:31 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 5:01 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Eric:
>>
>> I was thinking P-256, but I could be talked into:
>>
>> MUST support P-256
>> SHOULD support P-384
>>
>
> I would tend to just think MUST p-256. Less is more
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> Russ
>>
>>
>> On May 15, 2016, at 11:36 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>> This seems largely reasonable. I would consider removing the SHOULD for
>> RSA for
>> PASSporT signatures, for two reasons:
>>
>> 1. There's no legacy to deal with
>> 2. Because these objects are just sent out with no negotiation, it's not
>> that useful
>> to know that relying parties might or might not support your algorithm.
>> The safe
>> thing to do would be ECDSA.
>>
>> I would also note that the above doesn't specify a curve, but I assume
>> we're talking
>> P-256.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 9, 2016 at 1:37 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I would rather be a bit more granular.
>>>
>>>         MUST support ECDSA for PASSporT signatures
>>>         SHOULD support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for PASSporT signatures
>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>         MUST support ECDSA for certificate signatures
>>>         MUST support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for certificate signatures
>>>
>>> Then, we should say something to product planners that at some point in
>>> the future, we expect support for RSA to be downgraded.
>>>
>>> Russ
>>>
>>
>>
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