[stir] reality check

Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.com> Thu, 16 March 2017 13:03 UTC

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Cc: "stir@ietf.org" <stir@ietf.org>, "Peterson, Jon" <jon.peterson@neustar.biz>
From: Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.com>
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Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 09:03:20 -0400
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Subject: [stir] reality check
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Given the proclivity to use Bond themes,
it might be useful to take stock of what
seems like Never Say Die and the STIR/
SHAKEN gambit.

It is rather clear that given what is occurring
in different jurisdictions around the world,
STIR/SHAKEN has a chance of somewhere
close to zero to be implemented on even a
limited scale.  Talking about "governance"
seems delusional.

The only thing the FCC is doing is proposing
allowing regulated carriers to block traffic
at their customer's request. That is the best
possible outcome after what will be a long
comment and reply proceeding period, if not
additional litigation on multiple causes of

Given the overwhelming negative responses
about STIR/SHAKEN in the CRTC proceeding
comment period ending yesterday - especially
by Canadian industry, it seems highly unlikely
they are going to be implementing anything
along the lines of STIR/SHAKEN.

And then there is the rest of the world whose
views seem to range between outright rejection and
pursuit of probabilistic rather than ancient deterministic
(e.g., STIR/SHAKEN) solutions.  That was the
reaction at the ETSI CYBER#9 meeting a few
weeks ago.  It is also reflected in the latest draft
on the subject into the upcoming ITU-T SG17 meeting.
Indeed, there are multiple other inputs - especially
by Alibaba - that point to a shift to probabilistic
options.  Indeed, that is where the innovations
are occurring - and the FCC NPRM/NOI fortuitously
allows for them.  Canada being a progressive nation
seems likely to encourage them as well.

The emerging enhanced/extensible versions of
CNAM that facilitate probabilistic solutions are
where the focus seems likely.  (I'm still waiting
for the ATIS' version to be make publicly available.
It seems like don't want anyone so see it.)


ps. STIR/SHAKEN looks rather like the old CCITT
clinging onto the ancient past. :-)