Re: [stir] Choice of STIR signature algorithm

[Russ Housley <[e-mail]>]

Eric:

I was thinking P-256, but I could be talked into:

	MUST support P-256
	SHOULD support P-384

Russ


On May 15, 2016, at 11:36 AM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:

> This seems largely reasonable. I would consider removing the SHOULD for RSA for
> PASSporT signatures, for two reasons:
> 
> 1. There's no legacy to deal with
> 2. Because these objects are just sent out with no negotiation, it's not that useful
> to know that relying parties might or might not support your algorithm. The safe
> thing to do would be ECDSA.
> 
> I would also note that the above doesn't specify a curve, but I assume we're talking
> P-256.
> 
> -Ekr
> 
> 
> On Mon, May 9, 2016 at 1:37 PM, Russ Housley <[e-mail]> wrote:
> I would rather be a bit more granular.
> 
>         MUST support ECDSA for PASSporT signatures
>         SHOULD support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for PASSporT signatures
> 
> and
> 
>         MUST support ECDSA for certificate signatures
>         MUST support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for certificate signatures
> 
> Then, we should say something to product planners that at some point in the future, we expect support for RSA to be downgraded.
> 
> Russ