[stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow this kind of stuff.
Andy Newton <andy@hxr.us> Wed, 08 October 2025 15:51 UTC
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Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2025 11:51:43 -0400
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To: Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com>, Brett Nemeroff <Brett.Nemeroff@numeracle.com>
References: <BDE3EA55-E1F7-4575-9251-874BD0CEFD37@shockey.us> <CAD5OKxsXX-+QcJCN_ymdO1XC_jEtbUcZq81oiPo7+DOnV2R+VA@mail.gmail.com> <49BE4C2A-DC24-4445-A296-A8E26689DA2A@shockey.us> <CAD5OKxvVwVyeF1AYY72rCEhFNkYuxB=D8EOt+1iDSB5LyMLwLQ@mail.gmail.com> <DM6PR13MB406762742DB674A370055AAB9AE1A@DM6PR13MB4067.namprd13.prod.outlook.com> <CAD5OKxsCDRA_TWfqBNQjpoACntFfqOS98cVHL8aWNR8YKvjR+Q@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Andy Newton <andy@hxr.us>
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CC: Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us>, IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org>, "art@ietf.org" <art@ietf.org>
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Subject: [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow this kind of stuff.
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Hi all, Thanks for providing this information to the community. It appears some good technical considerations have arisen for our SIP groups. At this point, these conversations should move to STIR or SIPCORE. No need to continue to involve all of ART. Thanks for your contributions. -andy, ART AD On 08-10-2025 1:18 AM, Roman Shpount wrote: > Brett, > > FCC was very deliberate in not specifying the KYC requirements. This being said, all carriers introducing traffic to the US phone network should have a KYC policy described in the RMD database. Carriers that did not provide an adequate policy have been removed from the RMD database and are no longer permitted to originate traffic. Additionally, if, as a carrier, I can set the A-level attestation for the call based on my KYC policy, I should be able to specify the Rich Call Data accordingly, especially if this is required when A-level attestation is provided. > > I have a strong feeling that certain providers care more about creating new sources of revenue for themselves through regulatory arbitrage than about creating a healthy infrastructure to prevent robocalls. A glaring example is iConnectiv providing SPC tokens, but not the signing certificates, which artificially creates business for specialized certificate authorities. Ironically, this business opportunity is so small and labour-intensive that no one actually wants to do it, trying to shepherd carriers towards the hosted signing solution. > > To summarize, if, as a carrier, I am entrusted with an SPC token, I should be trusted to provide the Rich Call Data. If I am not trusted to provide Rich Call Data into the network, I should not be introducing any traffic into it. If the FCC mandates Rich Call Data, it should mandate that carriers accept it without creating walled gardens, with each carrier charging a fee to actually accept the data. > > Finally, if we intend to mandate the transmission of personally identifiable data with every call, we need to update SIP with a scalable and secure transport protocol. Most current carrier SIP implementations still use UDP. SIP-over-TLS suffers from head-of-the-line congestion issues. SIP is in dire need of a secure datagram-based protocol, such as QUIC. I am surprised that no one from the STIR group brought this to the SIPCore, so that a more scalable and secure protocol capable of carrying Rich Call Data could be standardized. > > Best Regards, > _____________ > Roman Shpount > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2025 at 8:42 PM Brett Nemeroff <Brett.Nemeroff@numeracle.com <mailto:Brett.Nemeroff@numeracle.com>> wrote: > > Hello Roman, > > In my opinion, US Carriers are unlikely to accept vanilla RCD data because of the lack of defined KYC. RCD is a very good vehicle for delivering the RCD, but it depends upon implicit trust of the originating service provider. “Vanilla” RCD offered like this to terminating service providers gives no assurance to the terminating service provider that the originator performed any specific KYC. > > CTIA’s BCID is based on RCD but details an ecosystem with specific KYC requirements. Participating in this ecosystem will allow for the delivery and native presentation of RCD. > > It’s worth noting that without a defined ecosystem for RCD such as BCID, RCD provides little (trust) benefit over traditional CNAM other than the fingerprints of the originating service provider for enforcement purposes. > > -Brett > > > > Brett Nemeroff > VP of Engineering - Voice > Brett.Nemeroff@numeracle.com <mailto:%7BE-mail%7D>| 1-512-203-3884 > > Logo.png <https://www.numeracle.com/> > > > > Empowering Calls with > Identity Management <https://www.numeracle.com/insights/entity-identity-management-to-empower-your-calls> > > * > > CONFIDENTIAL > > From: *Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com <mailto:roman@telurix.com>> > *Date: *Tuesday, October 7, 2025 at 7:24 PM > *To: *Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us <mailto:richard@shockey.us>> > *Cc: *IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org <mailto:stir@ietf.org>>, art@ietf.org <mailto:art@ietf.org> <art@ietf.org <mailto:art@ietf.org>> > *Subject: *[stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow this kind of stuff. > > > You don't often get email from roman@telurix.com <mailto:roman@telurix.com>. Learn why this is important <https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification> > > > In my day job, I see a lot of robocalls coming through the LEC local switches as TDM, as local re-origination with spoofed ANI. > > I would also love to sign Rich Call Data with my SPC token and not have wireless carriers discard this data. If I provide the information about my customer, I am unsure why I need to pay someone else to sign this information. > _____________ > Roman Shpount > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2025 at 8:11 PM Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us <mailto:richard@shockey.us>> wrote: > > It wont . You mean the legacy TDM/SS7 crap…this is the beginning of mandating all SIP in the US realtime US voice network as the British have done. > > I would not want to own a Tandem Access network. > > The US industry is pretty clear on this. You only need to read the FCC 17-97 docket at the FCC ECFS website to understand where the players actually are. > > This again is my day job. > > Richard Shockey > > Shockey Consulting LLC > > Chairman of the Board SIP Forum > > www.shockey.us <http://www.shockey.us/> > > www.sipforum.org <http://www.sipforum.org/> > > richard<at>shockey.us <http://shockey.us/> > > Skype-Linkedin-Facebook –Twitter rshockey101 > > PSTN +1 703-593-2683 > > *From: *Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com <mailto:roman@telurix.com>> > *Date: *Tuesday, October 7, 2025 at 7:37 PM > *To: *Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us <mailto:richard@shockey.us>> > *Cc: *IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org <mailto:stir@ietf.org>>, <art@ietf.org <mailto:art@ietf.org>> > *Subject: *[art] Re: [stir] For those of you who follow this kind of stuff. > > How would this work with PSTN links? > > _____________ > Roman Shpount > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2025 at 6:59 PM Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us <mailto:richard@shockey.us>> wrote: > > > The United States government is going to mandate Rich Call Data in the network. > > https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-415059A1.pdf <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-415059A1.pdf> > > > Richard Shockey > Shockey Consulting LLC > Chairman of the Board SIP Forum > www.shockey.us <http://www.shockey.us/> <http://www.shockey.us <http://www.shockey.us/>> > www.sipforum.org <http://www.sipforum.org/> > > richard<at>shockey.us <http://shockey.us/> > Skype-Linkedin-Facebook –Twitter rshockey101 > PSTN +1 703-593-2683 > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > stir mailing list -- stir@ietf.org <mailto:stir@ietf.org> > To unsubscribe send an email to stir-leave@ietf.org <mailto:stir-leave@ietf.org> > > _______________________________________________ art mailing list -- art@ietf.org <mailto:art@ietf.org> To unsubscribe send an email to art-leave@ietf.org <mailto:art-leave@ietf.org> > > > _______________________________________________ > stir mailing list -- stir@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to stir-leave@ietf.org
- [stir] For those of you who follow this kind of s… Richard Shockey
- [stir] Re: For those of you who follow this kind … Roman Shpount
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Richard Shockey
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Roman Shpount
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Brett Nemeroff
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Tim Bray
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Brett Nemeroff
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Richard Shockey
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Roman Shpount
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Chris Wendt
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Pierce Gorman
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Brett Nemeroff
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Roman Shpount
- [stir] Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Pierce Gorman
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Pierce Gorman
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Andy Newton
- [stir] Re: Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Daniel Hardman
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Roman Shpount
- [stir] Re: Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Russ Housley
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Richard Shockey
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Roman Shpount
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Henning Schulzrinne
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Roman Shpount
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Pierce Gorman
- [stir] Re: Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Orie
- [stir] Re: Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Peterson, Jon
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Brett Nemeroff
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: Re: Re: For those of you who… Richard Shockey
- [stir] Re: Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Daniel Hardman
- [stir] Re: [art] Re: For those of you who follow … Chris Wendt
- [stir] Re: Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) Brett Nemeroff