Re: [stir] Choice of STIR signature algorithm

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 5:01 PM, Russ Housley <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Eric:
>
> I was thinking P-256, but I could be talked into:
>
> MUST support P-256
> SHOULD support P-384
>

I would tend to just think MUST p-256. Less is more

-Ekr


>
> Russ
>
>
> On May 15, 2016, at 11:36 AM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> This seems largely reasonable. I would consider removing the SHOULD for
> RSA for
> PASSporT signatures, for two reasons:
>
> 1. There's no legacy to deal with
> 2. Because these objects are just sent out with no negotiation, it's not
> that useful
> to know that relying parties might or might not support your algorithm.
> The safe
> thing to do would be ECDSA.
>
> I would also note that the above doesn't specify a curve, but I assume
> we're talking
> P-256.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Mon, May 9, 2016 at 1:37 PM, Russ Housley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> I would rather be a bit more granular.
>>
>>         MUST support ECDSA for PASSporT signatures
>>         SHOULD support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for PASSporT signatures
>>
>> and
>>
>>         MUST support ECDSA for certificate signatures
>>         MUST support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for certificate signatures
>>
>> Then, we should say something to product planners that at some point in
>> the future, we expect support for RSA to be downgraded.
>>
>> Russ
>>
>
>