Re: [stir] [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling

Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu> Sat, 17 March 2018 21:09 UTC

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From: Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2018 17:08:41 -0400
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To: Steve Atkins <steve@wordtothewise.com>
Cc: Applications and Real-Time Area Discussion <art@ietf.org>, stir@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [stir] [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling
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I admit that I'm less than thrilled with having VoIP add to global warming.
Is that really what we want to accomplish, just as other blockchain-like
systems are getting, rightfully, dinged for that?

We have to consider that the most likely parties affected will be
legitimate mass callers, e.g., for emergency notifications or appointment
reminders, increasing their costs for no particularly good reason. As long
as this isn't universal, the bad guys will simply avoid such destinations.
(They don't seem to be focusing on the PBX market anyway - they may suspect
that corporate offices are not promising target markets for cruise deals
and credit repair pitches.)

Henning

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 4:49 PM, Steve Atkins <steve@wordtothewise.com>
wrote:

>
> > On Mar 17, 2018, at 10:58 AM, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Jonathan, Cullen,
> >
> > I was somewhat surprised that the draft did not have a direct reference
> to the SIP Hashcash work (especially since Cullen was the author of
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06).  From my
> perspective at least, it still looks to be a useful historical antecedent
> to consult, since it is a proof-of-work system (and one on which a bunch of
> later cryptocurrencies draw).  In particular, its view that this is about a
> demonstration of work rather than a payment to send may still be a valuable
> perspective.
> >
> > http://www.hashcash.org/ still appears to be up, by the way, for folks
> that want to see how its original use case tied into thwarting denial of
> service attacks.
>
> I hope someone is soliciting input from the email community, who went
> through this process a decade or so ago and noted that bad actors have
> much, much cheaper access to CPU for proof-of-work than good actors do.
>
> Cheers,
>   Steve
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