Re: [stir] [Last-Call] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226-02

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Fri, 11 June 2021 17:48 UTC

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To: Theresa Enghardt <ietf@tenghardt.net>, "Gorman, Pierce" <Pierce.Gorman@t-mobile.com>
Cc: "draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226.all@ietf.org>, IETF Gen-ART <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org>, "last-call@ietf.org" <last-call@ietf.org>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
References: <162283002740.11296.9657732547938468103@ietfa.amsl.com> <22F59565-04B0-4FBD-BEBE-DBAEBCB86A89@vigilsec.com> <BL0PR05MB4963A680358444325D2F141089379@BL0PR05MB4963.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> <4348b7f3-1f00-1a0c-bbc0-42942f9306d4@tenghardt.net>
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From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [stir] [Last-Call] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226-02
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I think Pierce's question was whether _this_ document, once published as 
an RFC, obsoletes (and replaces) 8226. It does not. It only updates 
8226, as noted on the first page, and in the metadata captured in the 
datatracker.

There is not an 8226bis effort underway at this time.

I've set the Reply-To for this message to just the STIR list. If there's 
any need to continue this thread, lets have the conversation there.

RjS - with STIR co-chair hat on

On 6/11/21 12:39 PM, Theresa Enghardt wrote:
> Dear Pierce,
>
> Once published, this I-D will result in a new numbered RFC, which 
> updates 8226. Note that this is exactly the procedure to issue an RFC 
> 8226bis (i.e., a -bis document is always a new numbered RFC, and the 
> published RFC 8226 does not change).
>
> Apologies if I misunderstood your question or if I'm missing any 
> relevant context such as other drafts in the STIR WG etc, in which 
> case I'd ask Russ and/or other STIR folks to chime in.
>
> Best,
> Theresa
>
>
> On 6/8/21 2:13 PM, Gorman, Pierce wrote:
>> Russ and Theresa,
>>
>> Please forgive my ignorance, but is the intent to issue an RFC 
>> 8226bis?  Or is the intent that the I-D result in a new numbered RFC 
>> which updates 8226?
>>
>> >From reading various things I've learned, I think, that new RFCs and 
>> updates to existing RFCs begin life as an Internet-Draft which may or 
>> may not be adopted by a working group as a work item.  If adopted by 
>> the group, the author/editor continues development of the I-D until 
>> such time as it expires or is promoted to last call, et cetera.  The 
>> end result in many cases are new numbered RFCs which may obsolete or 
>> update existing RFCs as appropriate.  The STIR RFC 4474 had a 4474bis 
>> version that remained unchanged for some years before being obsoleted 
>> by RFC 8224 for which it was a conceptual foundation and that is now 
>> a key component of the STIR/SHAKEN set of standards required to be 
>> used by US VoIP service providers by law and federal mandate.
>>
>> The reason I ask was because of some of the conversation at the last 
>> (I think) interim meeting and on the e-mail distribution where 
>> proposed changes were suggested to be submitted as a new I-D.  This 
>> -02 version may be the same sort of thing but confusion/ignorance on 
>> my part about naming and procedures made me want to ask.
>>
>> Respectfully,
>>
>> Pierce Gorman
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: stir <stir-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Russ Housley
>> Sent: Saturday, June 5, 2021 3:18 PM
>> To: Theresa Enghardt <ietf@tenghardt.net>
>> Cc: draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226.all@ietf.org; IETF Gen-ART 
>> <gen-art@ietf.org>rg>; last-call@ietf.org; IETF STIR Mail List 
>> <stir@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [stir] [Last-Call] Genart last call review of 
>> draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226-02
>>
>> [External]
>>
>>
>> Theresa:
>>
>> Thanks for your thoughtful review.
>>
>> See my responses in-line.  I'll post an updated I-D when IETF Last 
>> Call ends.
>>
>>> Reviewer: Theresa Enghardt
>>> Review result: Ready with Issues
>>>
>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
>>> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by
>>> the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just like
>>> any other last call comments.
>>>
>>> For more information, please see the FAQ at
>>>
>>> <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftrac.ietf.org%2Ftrac%2Fgen%2Fwiki%2FGenArtfaq&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cpierce.gorman%40t-mobile.com%7C40491250c2394836923608d9285f1574%7Cbe0f980bdd994b19bd7bbc71a09b026c%7C0%7C0%7C637585211113043953%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=QbFtT%2FIZ0CUXQB%2B0LUm3zIzgWqQQ%2BTk%2BNUJtuJelda8%3D&amp;reserved=0>. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Document: draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226-02
>>> Reviewer: Theresa Enghardt
>>> Review Date: 2021-06-04
>>> IETF LC End Date: 2021-06-10
>>> IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
>>>
>>> Summary: The draft is basically ready for publication as a Standards
>>> Track RFC, but it has some clarity issues that need to be addressed 
>>> before publication.
>>>
>>> Major issues: None.
>>>
>>> Minor issues:
>>>
>>> Abstract:
>>>
>>> Please expand JWT on first use.
>>> Assuming PASSporT is an acronym, please expand it on first use.
>>> The phrase "STIR certificates" appears in the title, but is not used
>>> in the abstract, introduction, or the draft in general. Is this
>>> intentional? Is STIR the same as PASSporT, in which case it could be 
>>> replaced?
>> How about the replacement Abstract:
>>
>>     RFC 8226 specifies the use of certificates for Secure Telephone
>>     Identity Credentials, and these certificates are often called "STIR
>>     Certificates".  RFC 8226 provides a certificate extension to
>>     constrain the JSON Web Token (JWT) claims that can be included in 
>> the
>>     Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) as defined in RFC 8225. If the
>>     PASSporT signer includes a JWT claim outside the constraint
>>     boundaries, then the PASSporT recipient will reject the entire
>>     PASSporT.  This document updates RFC 8226 to define an additional 
>> way
>>     that the JWT claims can be constrained.
>>
>>> Section 1: Introduction
>>>
>>> "Section 8 of [RFC8226] provides a certificate extension to constrain
>>>    the JWT claims that can be included in the PASSporT [RFC8225].  If
>>>    the signer includes a JWT claim outside the constraint boundaries,
>>>    then the recipient will reject the entire PASSporT."
>>>
>>> That's basically copied straight out of the Abstract (or the other 
>>> way round).
>>> Please provide some basic context for those who are not deeply
>>> involved with JWT/PassporT.
>> I do think that it makes sense to expand the Introduction to say more 
>> about STIR certificates, but I do not think that the Introduction 
>> should repeat too much of RFC 8226.
>>
>>> For example:
>>> - How does establishing authority over telephone numbers work,
>>> broadly? Does establishing authority mean that certifying that a
>>> telephone number belongs to, say, a specific organization? Or does
>>> anything happen "over" something telephony-related, as in some VoIP
>>> technology? (The "over telephone numbers" is ambiguous on first read.)
>>> - Is the PASSPorT a set of certificates or something else? Are these
>>> X.509 certificates or some other kind of certificates? Is the 
>>> technology described in this doc independent of the format of the 
>>> certificate?
>>> - Does the actual process of "establishing authority" happen over,
>>> e.g., a Web API? Are there other ways? Is the technology described
>>> here specific to some way of "establishing authority"? - What is JWT
>>> and what are JWT claims? - Are JWT claim constraints provided in the
>>> certificate (PASSportT?) or are they communicated separately? Who
>>> provides them? The draft later talks about CA, authentication service,
>>> verification service - It would be good to briefly name these actors
>>> in the Introduction already and briefly describe to whom the change 
>>> in this doc applies.
>> Is this enough?
>>
>>     The use of certificates [RFC5280] in establishing authority over
>>     telephone numbers is described in [RFC8226].  These certificates are
>>     often called "STIR Certificates".  STIR certificates are an 
>> important
>>     element of the overall system that prevents the impersonation of
>>     telephone numbers on the Internet.
>>
>>     Section 8 of [RFC8226] provides a certificate extension to constrain
>>     the JSON Web Token (JWT) claims that can be included in the Personal
>>     Assertion Token (PASSporT) [RFC8225].  If the PASSporT signer
>>     includes a JWT claim outside the constraint boundaries, then the
>>     PASSporT recipient will reject the entire PASSporT.
>>
>>     This document defines an enhanced JWTClaimConstraints certificate
>>     extension, which provides all of the capabilities available in the
>>     original certificate extension as well as an additional way to
>>     constrain the allowable JWT claims.  That is, the enhanced extension
>>     can provide a list of claims that are not allowed to be included in
>>     the PASSporT.
>>
>>> Please consider adding a brief explanation why further constraints on
>>> PASSporT claims may be necessary.
>> I suggest two additional paragraphs at the end of the above 
>> Introduction:
>>
>>     The Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension is 
>> needed to
>>     limit the authority when a parent STIR certificate delegates to a
>>     subordinate STIR certificate.  For example,
>>     [I-D.ietf-stir-cert-delegation] describes the situation where 
>> service
>>     providers issue a STIR certificate to enterprises or other customers
>>     to sign PASSporTs, and the Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints 
>> certificate
>>     extension can be used to prevent specific claims from being included
>>     in PASSporTs and accepted as valid by the PASSporT recipient.
>>
>>     The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension defined in [RFC8226]
>>     provides a list of claims that must be included in a valid PASSporT
>>     as well as a list if permitted values for selected claims. The
>>     Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension defined in this
>>     document includes those capabilities and adds a list of claims that
>>     must not be included in a valid PASSporT.
>>
>>> Section 3: Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints Syntax
>>>
>>> "The Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension limits the
>>>    PASSporT claims and the claim values that can successfully validated
>>>    by the certificate that contains the extension."
>>> Are the claims and claim values validated BY the certificate? Aren't
>>> they validated by some recipient, e.g., a verification service? (A
>>> similar statement appears in Section 7: "[...] some combinations can
>>> prevent any PASSporT from being successfully validated by the
>>> certificate.")
>> Addressing comments below changed this part of Section 3.  More on 
>> Section 7 below.
>>
>>> "Certificate issuers
>>>    permit all claims by omitting the Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints
>>>    certificate extension from the extension field of the certificate
>>>    [RFC5280].  The certificate extension is non-critical, applicable
>>>    only to end-entity certificates, and defined with ASN.1 [X.680].  
>>> The
>>>    syntax of the JWT claims in a PASSporT is specified in [RFC8225]."
>>> As this paragraph defines the scope of the extension, it seems
>>> misplaced under "Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints Syntax" as it's not
>>> describing the actual syntax. Maybe either some of this text should be
>>> moved to "Introduction", or a new section could be added, e.g., titled
>>> "Scope of Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints"?
>> As you can see above, I moved some of this to the end of the 
>> Introduction.  This part remains:
>>
>>     The Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension is non-
>>     critical, applicable only to end-entity certificates, and defined
>>     with ASN.1 [X.680].  The syntax of the JWT claims in a PASSporT is
>>     specified in [RFC8225].
>>
>>> The section then goes on to describe constraints. What is the
>>> difference between the described constrains and RFC 8226, i.e., what 
>>> is added by this doc?
>> I think that is now answered by the last paragraph of the Introduction.
>>
>>> Section 7: Security considerations
>>>
>>> "Certificate issuers should not include an entry in mustExclude for
>>>    the "rcdi" claim for a certificate that will be used with the
>>>    PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data defined in
>>>    [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-rcd].  Excluding this claim would prevent 
>>> the
>>>    integrity protection mechanism from working properly."
>>> Is this supposed to be a normative SHOULD? If it is, perhaps it should
>>> be moved up to, e.g., Section 3.
>> I do not think so.  I have been coordinating with the authors of 
>> draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd, and both documents will warn 
>> implementers about the situation.
>>
>>> Several paragraphs here describe scenarios that prevent successful
>>> validation of any PASSporT. What is the specific security risk here,
>>> e.g., Denial of Service? Any other consequences? Could there be a
>>> possibility for, e.g., a malicious actor introducing constraints that
>>> prevent successful validation? Are any (other) attacks possible on
>>> this technology (e.g., malicious deletion of constraints, replay 
>>> attacks), and what countermeasures exist?
>> If the malicious actors can sign certificates, then these constraints 
>> will be the least of the worries.  I think that is covered by the 
>> pointer to RFC 5280.
>>
>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>
>>> Section 3: Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints Syntax
>>>
>>> OLD: "[...] the claim values that can successfully validated by the
>>> certificate [...]" NEW: "[...] the claim values that can be 
>>> successfully
>>> validated by the certificate [...]" (And/or rephrase sentence, see
>>> comment above)
>> Addressing above comments changed this part of Section 3.
>>
>>> Section 4: Usage Examples
>>>
>>> OLD: "If a CA issues to an authentication service certificate that
>>>           includes an Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate 
>>> extension [...]"
>>> Is this either:
>>> NEW: "If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that
>>>           includes an Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate 
>>> extension [...]"
>>> Or is it:
>>> NEW: "If a CA issues an authentication service certificate that
>>>           includes an Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate 
>>> extension [...]"
>>> (This sentence is very long and not easy to parse in general, maybe it
>>> can be rephrased or split?)
>> It is "If a CA issues a certificate to an authentication service ,,,"
>>
>> I got rid of the semicolon, and made two sentences.
>>
>>> Section 7: Security Considerations
>>>
>>> This paragraph appears twice, unless I'm missing a subtle difference:
>>> "   Certificate issuers must take care when imposing constraints on the
>>>    PASSporT claims and the claim values that can successfully 
>>> validated;
>>>    some combinations can prevent any PASSporT from being successfully
>>>    validated by the certificate.  For example, an entry in mustInclude
>>>    and an entry in mustExclude for the same claim will prevent
>>>    successful validation on any PASSporT."
>> Good catch.  I deleted one of them.
>>
>> Russ
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> stir mailing list
>> stir@ietf.org
>> https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fstir&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cpierce.gorman%40t-mobile.com%7C40491250c2394836923608d9285f1574%7Cbe0f980bdd994b19bd7bbc71a09b026c%7C0%7C0%7C637585211113054217%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=ITvmEkX683nmfZ4HH8owXKlroFxBDV8LtXkqvre3Co0%3D&amp;reserved=0 
>>
>>