Re: [stir] certificates: short-lived or status

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Wed, 15 March 2017 23:47 UTC

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:47:48 -0400
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To: "DOLLY, MARTIN C" <md3135@att.com>
Cc: "Peterson, Jon" <jon.peterson@neustar.biz>, "stir@ietf.org" <stir@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [stir] certificates: short-lived or status
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So you're trusting the folks issuing certificates to be perfectly reliable,
and service providers never to use a cert for a number that's been ported
away?

On Wed, Mar 15, 2017 at 7:42 PM, DOLLY, MARTIN C <md3135@att.com> wrote:

> I do not see the need for short lived certs for a TN call setup service
>
> *Martin C. Dolly*
>
> Lead Member of Technical Staff
>
> Core & Government/Regulatory Standards
>
> AT&T
>
> Cell: +1.609.903.3360
>
> Email: *md3135@att.com <md3135@att.com>*
>
>
>
> On Mar 15, 2017, at 7:37 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> I would note that "freshness" is but one aspect of a certificate that you
> need OCSP for.  The far more common use in the WebPKI is when the CA simply
> screws up.
>
> In any case, to recap the experience from the Web PKI, the trade-off space
> has basically the following shape:
>
> 1. Do a live query [draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp]
> 2. Make something with a short lifetime
> 2.a. Mandatory OCSP stapling
> 2.b. Short-lived certificates [draft-peterson-stir-
> certificates-shortlived]
>
> The trade-off is basically between the sender/signer having to do queries
> (to refresh OCSP or get a new cert) and recipient/verifier having to do
> queries (to fetch OCSP).  (2.a) is a bad deal unless you have some legacy
> need to use OCSP; otherwise it's just bloat relative to (2.b).
>
> If you ask web people, you're likely to get a pretty strong preference for
> (2), i.e., putting the burden on the sender, because (a) it's more
> predictable and (b) it's offline with respect to call time, and thus much
> less performance sensitive.  The web started out with (1) and it has turned
> out to be totally unworkable, because the CAs can't operate OCSP servers
> that are good enough to avoid seriously degrading the performance of
> browsing experience.
>
> The main push-back we get from server operators about (2) is that it
> requires outbound connections from web servers -- load and downtime never
> come up as issues.  Outbound connections shouldn't be an issue for STIR
> signers, since they're likely to be making outbound connections all the
> time anyway.  Even if not, it's a simple firewall rule to write to let out
> connections to your CA.
>
> --Richard
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 15, 2017 at 4:33 PM, Peterson, Jon <jon.peterson@neustar.biz>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> In reaction to the IESG review, and as well, to our own general sense
>> that we're still not ready to mandate any particular direction, we ended up
>> pulling the real-time status check of OCSP out of the last version of
>> stir-certificates. Figuring out how we want to manage certificate
>> freshness, especially in light of certificates assigned to telephone
>> numbers, is probably the last bit about the core STIR work, before we go on
>> to extensions and so forth, that we need to tackle.
>>
>> I'd like to spend some meeting time talking about two approaches, as well
>> as any better ideas anybody comes up with for this. The first is roughly
>> what was in the stir-certificates document previously, which is now
>> captured in:
>>
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-00
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dstir-2Dcertificates-2Docsp-2D00&d=DwMFaQ&c=LFYZ-o9_HUMeMTSQicvjIg&r=G9v8uCSSQhCmpw7ItG0r2g&m=p0Tz67-L9Fy0iCB4NsaQL-xivtUT_OhohUYV7gr17x0&s=RPvZjXuy_wnl9IwmrPj4Y6KsACaINE1guHTRyh5Eki4&e=>
>>
>> The other is an approach based on short-lived certificates, which would
>> likely rely on ACME or something similar. I've mocked up a discussion draft
>> for that:
>>
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-peterson-stir-certificates
>> -shortlived-00
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dpeterson-2Dstir-2Dcertificates-2Dshortlived-2D00&d=DwMFaQ&c=LFYZ-o9_HUMeMTSQicvjIg&r=G9v8uCSSQhCmpw7ItG0r2g&m=p0Tz67-L9Fy0iCB4NsaQL-xivtUT_OhohUYV7gr17x0&s=NdnWiTSJii5i3j1NaEkrF56dhUYNP0kFJXCtqr_sPdg&e=>
>>
>> ... though it is still fairly content-free at the moment.
>>
>> I think reviewing what we've done with stir-certs and these two
>> approaches warrants some face-time discussion. Thoughts here on the list
>> beforehand are welcome too.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon Peterson
>> Neustar, Inc.
>>
>>
>>
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>>
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