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Re: [stir] Choice of STIR signature algorithm

Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com> Wed, 25 May 2016 17:29 UTC

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From: Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com>
In-Reply-To: <43E97208-EBA0-4DE6-8CB7-E9AAFD212A3B@chriswendt.net>
Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 13:29:23 -0400
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References: <D32953D1.4770F%john.mattsson@ericsson.com> <1A843300-AEB7-4EC6-8256-C88F6847B82E@neustar.biz> <D329995E.477D9%john.mattsson@ericsson.com> <A3723DBB-476C-4F22-95E0-37AE0872FBBD@shockey.us> <F4F09888-780B-4725-9A74-AD2EF661C5C0@vigilsec.com> <0DD82221-E79D-4F15-B2B5-93165EC98919@shockey.us> <570534D4.6010707@nostrum.com> <5195FEBC-8395-4E77-B768-2B2D81144121@shockey.us> <56DF2D20-9381-45CB-8057-6B1AB99B05E9@chriswendt.net> <BB4B8171-BF3E-4D3F-B81B-73AC9768ED75@shockey.us> <D3316C0C.485E4%john.mattsson@ericsson.com> <2EC06927-2614-491E-A499-C86ABB30573C@chriswendt.net> <26AE9662-B919-4B22-AFF8-45CF351AA03F@vigilsec.com> <2C466A8A-D638-49AE-9698-699D67762FF1@standardstrack.com> <EED4C512-B57C-47EC-9CE4-07C64365D246@vigilsec.com> <CABcZeBN3OLiaea10cWrtyv6R9KxHHVMuAsC56o=xmj6MWn_RYg@mail.gmail.com> <AA4D2199-3A8D-4015-86F3-DEE04120E51C@vigilsec.com> <CABcZeBPSLDeSLRgAyBqCR_K_-=F6Fck+CBZ1rSnLj7CNpDrGAA@mail.gmail.com> <43E97208-EBA0-4DE6-8CB7-E9AAFD212A3B@chriswendt.net>
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Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/stir/oTH5CiHB-WVo8MlTDBosXwbXevA>
Subject: Re: [stir] Choice of STIR signature algorithm
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And Eric’s [B’s] Law™ holds: Every SHOULD MUST have an UNLESS. Otherwise, the SHOULD is really a MAY which is really useless in a protocol specification.

> On May 19, 2016, at 8:11 AM, Chris Wendt <chris-ietf@chriswendt.net> wrote:
> 
> Whenever we say SHOULD i believe this is in the context of the authentication service only, because this would imply a MUST on the verification side, right?
> 
> So, should we go there or just stick with MUST on
> 
>> On May 16, 2016, at 11:30 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 5:01 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>> wrote:
>> Eric:
>> 
>> I was thinking P-256, but I could be talked into:
>> 
>> 	MUST support P-256
>> 	SHOULD support P-384
>> 
>> I would tend to just think MUST p-256. Less is more
>> 
>> -Ekr
>> 
>> 
>> Russ
>> 
>> 
>> On May 15, 2016, at 11:36 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>> 
>>> This seems largely reasonable. I would consider removing the SHOULD for RSA for
>>> PASSporT signatures, for two reasons:
>>> 
>>> 1. There's no legacy to deal with
>>> 2. Because these objects are just sent out with no negotiation, it's not that useful
>>> to know that relying parties might or might not support your algorithm. The safe
>>> thing to do would be ECDSA.
>>> 
>>> I would also note that the above doesn't specify a curve, but I assume we're talking
>>> P-256.
>>> 
>>> -Ekr
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Mon, May 9, 2016 at 1:37 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>> wrote:
>>> I would rather be a bit more granular.
>>> 
>>>         MUST support ECDSA for PASSporT signatures
>>>         SHOULD support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for PASSporT signatures
>>> 
>>> and
>>> 
>>>         MUST support ECDSA for certificate signatures
>>>         MUST support RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for certificate signatures
>>> 
>>> Then, we should say something to product planners that at some point in the future, we expect support for RSA to be downgraded.
>>> 
>>> Russ
>> 
>> 
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> 
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