Re: [storm] iSCSI: Authentication mechanism reduction

  Paul,

There where patent concerns (none confirmed!) but SRP by far the authors 
preference (simplest, secure)
and it would be a mistake to take it out. Enough to have it optional 
:-). At least we have an interoperable description.

Julo

On 22/05/10 19:17, Paul Koning wrote:
> I agree about keeping Kerberos.
>
> If we're looking at pulling out stuff, how about yanking SRP?  In spite
> of its arguable technical superiority I believe patent concerns have,
> and will, keep it from being used.
>
> 	paul
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: storm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:storm-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>> Of Julian Satran
>> Sent: Saturday, May 22, 2010 4:58 AM
>> To: storm@ietf.org
>> Cc: Ofer Biran
>> Subject: Re: [storm] iSCSI: Authentication mechanism reduction
>>
>>
>>    Hm... Kerberos is widely deployed even if common iSCSI initiators
> are
>> not using it.
>> Wouldn't it be wiser to "revive" the GSSAPI version and have it
> replace
>> the current wording.
>> And it is certainly better than to be left with CHAP :-) (as the
>> primary).
>>
>> Julo
>>
>>
>> On 22/05/10 04:43, Black_David@emc.com wrote:
>>> <WG chair hat off>
>>>
>>> I'd like to propose removal of a few authentication mechanisms.  RFC
>> 3720 currently specifies five authentication mechanisms:
>>> 	- Kerberos (KRB5)
>>> 	- Simple public key (SPKM1 and SPKM2)
>>> 	- Secure Remote Password (SRP)
>>> 	- Challenge Handshake (CHAP)
>>>
>>> To my knowledge, SPKM1 and SPKM2 have never been implemented and are
>> not in use.  KRB5 has been implemented, but my understanding is that
> it
>> is not in use, and I understand that the specific iSCSI usage of
>> Kerberos isn't considered be the proverbial "right thing" to do
> because
>> it's not based on GSSAPI.  There was an Internet-Draft on adding
>> GSSAPI-based Kerberos authentication to iSCSI, but it's long since
>> expired.
>>> So, I would suggest removal of the KRB5, SPKM1 and SPKM2 methods
> from
>> the iSCSI consolidated draft with suitable reservation of the
>> authentication method names and negotiation key prefixes (KRB_AP_,
>> SPKM_) to prevent future reuse.
>>> Thanks,
>>> --David
>>> ----------------------------------------------------
>>> David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
>>> EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
>>> +1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
>>> black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
>>> ----------------------------------------------------
>>>
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