[Suit] intentional rollback of firmware

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 11 December 2019 18:37 UTC

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Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 13:37:14 -0500
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Subject: [Suit] intentional rollback of firmware
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The SUIT Architecture is clear that we need to prevent rollback attacks.
    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-suit-architecture-08#section-3.4

and this is also mentioned in SUIT-manifest 5.1.  But I can't find any
"hit-them-over-the-head" text in either Security Considerations explaining
how a customer should do a planned back out of a upgrade.
(Specifically: a higher manifest sequence number pointing at an older
firmware binary)

This implies that the customer/operator is able to produce signed manifests
that the device is willing to trust.

This has come up in the context of firmware updates for OpenBMC.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
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