Re: [Suit] [Teep] Default, mandatory-to-implement algorithm

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 24 February 2020 18:30 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: suit@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: suit@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E89AF3A10BA; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 10:30:59 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mZxz5ta6-ZEe; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 10:30:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:3:216:3eff:fe7c:d1f3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 61DD73A10B9; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 10:30:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sandelman.ca (obiwan.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2::247]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0170438981; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:29:56 -0500 (EST)
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 988661E5D; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:30:55 -0500 (EST)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, teep <teep@ietf.org>, suit@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <50BE66F5-02D8-4A50-BB11-4F55D32CCB75@vigilsec.com>
References: <AM0PR08MB37164BB214E250891B050CF9FAEC0@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com> <50BE66F5-02D8-4A50-BB11-4F55D32CCB75@vigilsec.com>
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 25.1.1
X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m<nPbLgmtKK-5dC@#:k
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:30:55 -0500
Message-ID: <23544.1582569055@localhost>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/suit/_6vuMD67EIrY3ijoKAHWHY4XP9A>
Subject: Re: [Suit] [Teep] Default, mandatory-to-implement algorithm
X-BeenThere: suit@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Software Updates for Internet of Things <suit.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/suit>, <mailto:suit-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/suit/>
List-Post: <mailto:suit@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:suit-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/suit>, <mailto:suit-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 18:31:00 -0000

{should this be CC'ed to SUIT?}

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
    > In the SUIT WG, I have been advocating HSS/LMS Hash-based signature as
    > the MTI algorithm.  This is a quantum resistant signature, and NIST has
    > already started the process to make it a FIPS-approved algorithm

That's great news!
Once we have paid the code space and figured out the network bandwidth to
accomodate it, does it even make sense to have another MTI?

I am concerned that the MTI, if not used periodically, might rot.
Or it might be surprising when we have to use it, that the cost is too high.

I am not clear if we need HSS/LMS for the general TEEP use.
It seems that the thing that need a quantum resistant secure upgrade is for
the TEE Agent code, not the TAx.  I'm not clear that the TEE Agent code
maintenance is even part of TEEP's mandate.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-