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Re: [Suit] NIST selected PQM algorithms

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Sat, 09 July 2022 20:14 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Koen Zandberg <koen.zandberg@inria.fr>, suit@ietf.org
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Date: Sat, 09 Jul 2022 16:14:34 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Suit] NIST selected PQM algorithms
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Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
    > I think SUIT needs to look at SPHINCS+ as an alternative to HSS/LMS for
    > the hash-based signature algorithm, but the NIST standard for SPHINCS+
    > will probably not be available for a year.

please expand: "not be available"

Is it the same, in IETF terms as, "will not have passed AUTH48", or
does it mean, "will not have passed WGLC"?

I guess what I am asking is: will there be bits-on-the-wire changes?

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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