Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 31 May 2021 16:41 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "suit@ietf.org" <suit@ietf.org>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00
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Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
    >> I agree that there are also challenges with certification schemes that
    >> prevent developers from seeing the source code (or from publishing the
    >> source code). That's yet another issue.

    > SUIT is using signature for the authentication and integrity of the
    > firmware.  If the signature remains in place, a party in the middle of
    > the distribution cannot insert any malware.

The encryption of the firmware keeps third parties from auditing the software
updates to determine if malware has been inserted at the "factory"
Both white and black hats are currently using binary diff systems to look at
patches.  Black hats use this to develop exploits in the gap between 9am EST
and 9am PST!
I am suggesting that this is a "Security Consideration"

    >> Can an ECDH be part of an IDevID?
    >>
    >> [Hannes] You should be able to answer that question...

    > Are you aware of anyone that is putting key agreement public keys in
    > the IDevID?  I thought everyone was using signature keys.

Yes, that was the point of my question.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide