Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

[Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>]

Dick, I understand your line of argument.

At the same time I want to create awareness for the attacker point of view. They need to get access to plaintext firmware of an embedded device (unless the attacker already knows what the source was used). This is why there are advanced disassemblers available (such as IDA Pro, Binary Ninja, and Ghidra -- to name a few).

As a way forward I am proposing to use the additional data carried in the manifest for doing the SCRM risk assessment step. I believe that this should work.

Ciao
Hannes

-----Original Message-----
From: Dick Brooks <[e-mail]>
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 10:00 PM
To: Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>; 'Russ Housley' <[e-mail]>
Cc: 'Michael Richardson' <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

Thanks, Hannes. I just submitted a concern regarding the problem encryption creates for malware scanning, which is one of the SCRM risk assessment steps, performed before installation

Thanks,

Dick Brooks

Never trust software, always verify and report! T http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
Email: [e-mail]
Tel: [phone]

-----Original Message-----
From: Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 3:57 PM
To: [e-mail]; 'Russ Housley' <[e-mail]>
Cc: 'Michael Richardson' <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

Hi Dick,

with the SUIT manifest format I hope we can make information available to trusted third parties (MUD, COSWID and alike) and at the same time use encrypted binaries. Having access to the plaintext binary is essential for adversaries to mount attacks. (Happy to give a tutorial about how this
works.)

Like-wise differential updates may make it difficult for SCRM vendors to make their analysis but the information in the manifest can help them.

Severable fields allows to remove information from the manifest before it is sent to the device. This reduces overhead and prevents untrusted parties from gathering information from the manifest.

Ciao
Hannes

-----Original Message-----
From: Dick Brooks <[e-mail]>
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 7:07 PM
To: 'Russ Housley' <[e-mail]>
Cc: 'Michael Richardson' <[e-mail]>; Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

I agree, Russ.

Parties subject to the 5/12 Executive Order (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/ex
ecutive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/) will likely want to perform a proactive SCRM risk assessment prior to installation, if my interpretation of the EO is accurate.

Thanks,

Dick Brooks

Never trust software, always verify and report! T http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
Email: [e-mail]
Tel: [phone]

-----Original Message-----
From: Russ Housley <[e-mail]>
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 12:56 PM
To: Dick Brooks <[e-mail]>
Cc: Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>; Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

Dick:

Yes, and there are other use cases that require encryption.

Russ


> On May 31, 2021, at 12:53 PM, Dick Brooks
<[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> " If a trustworthy party in the middle of the distribution path is
> able to detect a problem with cleartext (but signed) firmware, they
> can report a vulnerability and refuse to pass the update along."
>
> This is precisely the function SCRM vendors are performing today.
> Encrypting a binary object would be an impediment to software supply
> chain risk assessment functions in place today.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Dick Brooks
>
> Never trust software, always verify and report! T
> http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
> Email: [e-mail]
> Tel: [phone]
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Suit <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Russ Housley
> Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 12:49 PM
> To: Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00
>
> Michael:
>
>>>> I agree that there are also challenges with certification schemes
>>>> that prevent developers from seeing the source code (or from
>>>> publishing the source code). That's yet another issue.
>>
>>> SUIT is using signature for the authentication and integrity of the
>>> firmware.  If the signature remains in place, a party in the middle
>>> of the distribution cannot insert any malware.
>>
>> The encryption of the firmware keeps third parties from auditing the
>> software updates to determine if malware has been inserted at the
> "factory"
>> Both white and black hats are currently using binary diff systems to
>> look at patches.  Black hats use this to develop exploits in the gap
>> between 9am EST and 9am PST!
>> I am suggesting that this is a "Security Consideration"
>
> Yes, this is a reasonable thing to add to the Security Considerations.
>
> If a trustworthy party in the middle of the distribution path is able
> to detect a problem with cleartext (but signed) firmware, they can
> report a vulnerability and refuse to pass the update along.
>
> Russ
> _______________________________________________
> Suit mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/suit
>


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IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.