Re: [Syslog] Issue 9, 9a, and 9b

I agree with Robert that privacy can be achieved by means other than encryption,
but disagree that privacy is a MUST operationally.

As Chris pointed out, we have already said this in RFC5424
"In most cases, passing clear-text messages is a benefit to the
    operations staff if they are sniffing the packets from the wire.  "
which means I think we should say

"Implementations MUST support DTLS 1.1 [RFC4347] and MUST at a
     minimum support the mandatory to implement cipher suite ,
    which is
     TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC5246].  If additional cipher suites are
     supported, then implementations MUST NOT negotiate a cipher suite
     that employs NULL integrity or authentication  algorithms.

   Where privacy is REQUIRED, then implementations must either negotiate
  a cipher suite that employs a non-NULL encryption algorithm or else achieve
  privacy  by other means, such as a physically secured network.

However, as [RFC5424] section 8 points out
'In most cases, passing clear-text messages is a benefit to the
    operations staff if they are sniffing the packets from the wire.'
and so where privacy is not a requirement, then it is advantageous
to use a NULL encryption algorithm.

Tom Petch

----- Original Message -----
From: <robert.horn@agfa.com>
To: <clonvick@cisco.com>
Cc: <syslog@ietf.org>; <syslog-bounces@ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2010 2:10 PM
Subject: Re: [Syslog] Issue 9, 9a, and 9b - from a Tim Polk COMMENT

> > >
> > > I think you'll need to add some text that says if confidentiality is
> > > required, the NULL cipher suites MUST NOT negotiate NULL encryption
> ciphers.
> > >
> > > I'm hoping that we can keep the part about MUST NOT support NULL
> integrity
> > > and authentication algorithms in Section 5.3.  But, add a new
> lastsentence
> > > that says something like:
> > >
> > > When confidentiality is provided by [insert mechanism here], then NULL
>
> > > encryption algorithms MAY be negotiated.
> >
> > Let's change that to:
> >     When confidentiality is desired but without the overhead of using
> DTLS
> >     encryption, then it may be provided by provisioning a physically
> >     secured network.  In that case the NULL encryption algorithm may be
> >     negotiated.
> >
> > Does that work?
> >
>
> Those words could work.  It would be better if the phrase "physically
> secured network" were "appropriately secured network".  I'm thinking about
> people who are using VLAN and other low level hardware technologies.
> Someone who understands the issues can decide whether their low level
> hardware approach is a suitable equivalent to "physically secured" so this
> is less imprtant.   Either wording results in implementations that can be
> configured to meet the need.
>
> Kind Regards,
>
> Robert Horn | Agfa HealthCare
> Research Scientist | HE/Technology Office
> T  +1 978 897 4860
>
> Agfa HealthCare Corporation, 100 Challenger Road, Ridgefield Park, NJ,
> 07660-2199, United States
> http://www.agfa.com/healthcare/
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