Re: [T2TRG] RESTful Design & Security

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Thu, 09 March 2017 15:00 UTC

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To: "Garcia-Morchon O, Oscar" <oscar.garcia-morchon@philips.com>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "Kovatsch, Matthias" <matthias.kovatsch@siemens.com>, "mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca" <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 16:00:02 +0100
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Subject: Re: [T2TRG] RESTful Design & Security
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Hi Oskar,


I'm sorry I wasn't clear, but my point is that one needs to be able to
answer these sorts of questions in order to determine what the end is in
"end to end" security and shat the identity model for these things are. 
There may be little if any networking available to the "end"  in some cases.


Eliot


On 3/9/17 3:32 PM, Garcia-Morchon O, Oscar wrote:
>
> Hi Eliot,
>
>
> i believe that your two examples (fridge and car) describe a system
> (fridge and car) within a larger system (smart home or V2X). More
> complex scenarios exist.
>
>
> You could analyze such scenarios by decomposing the larger system into
> subsystems (domains) and applying the security considerations to each
> of the domains in which the "smart things or smart components" in that
> domain talk to each other. 
>
>
> Does this help you further?Would you analyze this in a different way?
> Do you think that this explanation should be included in the our
> document? 
>
>
> Cheers, Oscar.
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 8, 2017 4:46 PM
> *To:* Garcia-Morchon O, Oscar; Hannes Tschofenig; Kovatsch, Matthias;
> mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
> *Cc:* T2TRG@irtf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [T2TRG] RESTful Design & Security
>  
>
> Oscar,
>
> That's a great document.  In some ways, it's really several documents
> all rolled up into one.  But Let me ask some leading questions:
>
>   * Is my network-connected refrigerator a Thing or a component?
>   * Is the thermostat in my network-connected refrigerator a Thing or
>     a component?
>   * Is my network-connected car a Thing or a component?
>   * Is the engine that sits on the CAN bus a Thing or a component?
>
> What distinguishes a Thing from a component and when do your security
> considerations apply, and when do they not?
>
> Eliot
>
>
> On 3/8/17 4:31 PM, Garcia-Morchon O, Oscar wrote:
>> Hi Hannes,
>>
>> the document " draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons-01" summarizes protocols.  But I do not think that we do this happily but seriously. Summarizing existing protocols/work is one of the goals of the document.
>>
>> The document also acknowledges that devices have different capabilities and requirements, also in terms of security. In my view, this fits with the idea of minimum requirements. It would be great to have your input on your use cases and your views on minimum assumptions in different deployment scenarios/security capabilities of different types of devices.
>>
>> Cheers, Oscar.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: T2TRG [mailto:t2trg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 8, 2017 3:13 PM
>> To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>; Kovatsch, Matthias <matthias.kovatsch@siemens.com>; mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
>> Cc: T2TRG@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [T2TRG] RESTful Design & Security
>>
>> Hi Eliot,
>>
>> this would indeed be a good conversation to have. I have tried to trigger it a couple of times in context of the IoT device classes but it is very hard to get people to state what their minimum assumptions are.
>>
>> I believe it has to do with the type of standardization approach we are exercising today and this gives us a hard time to describe the big picture of how the various building blocks are supposed to work together. In fact, the picture becomes extremely complex and fragmented since there are just so many options while at the same time we envision super constrained devices. The T2TRG security document
>> (draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons-01) confirms this and happily talks about normal IPsec/IKE, diet IPsec, HIP, MIKEY, OSCOAP, JOSE, COSE, etc. etc.
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>> On 03/08/2017 11:02 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>>> Matthias,
>>>
>>> I think the key question that everyone seems to be dancing around is this:
>>>
>>> What is an Internet host in the context of IoT?  What are the minimum
>>> qualities it must possess?  I don't mean this to be a vote, but more
>>> of a law of physics sort of thing.  For instance, does a host have a
>>> secure unique identity?  What capabilities must it have?  I would
>>> expect them to be very few, but there are assuredly some...
>>>
>>> Eliot
>>>
>>>
>>> On 3/7/17 8:36 PM, Kovatsch, Matthias wrote:
>>>> Fair enough.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I am on this IoT Directorate. I would say a large fraction of
>>>> the T2TRG participants has been arguing that the Internet of Gateways
>>>> is not a good approach. Your security-related summary proves this point.
>>>>
>>>> I personally don't see end-to-end security happening if we keep
>>>> mixing application protocols, keep using black-magic middleboxes, and
>>>> keep using proprietary interfaces at the device level. We need
>>>> something end-to-end (or T2T) for end-to-end security.
>>>>
>>>> Best wishes
>>>> Matthias
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sent from my phone, limitations might apply.
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> *From:* Hannes Tschofenig [hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net]
>>>> *Received:* Tuesday, 07 Mar 2017, 20:10
>>>> *To:* Kovatsch, Matthias (CT RDA NEC EMB-DE)
>>>> [matthias.kovatsch@siemens.com]; mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
>>>> [mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca]
>>>> *CC:* T2TRG@irtf.org [T2TRG@irtf.org]
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [T2TRG] RESTful Design & Security
>>>>
>>>> Hi Matthias,
>>>>
>>>> I know that this is a research group and everyone can create whatever
>>>> they want.
>>>>
>>>> We briefly talked about security at the IoT directorate conference
>>>> call and I would be interesting to hear what works and what does not
>>>> work for others.
>>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 03/07/2017 07:45 PM, Kovatsch, Matthias wrote:
>>>>> On big propaganda tour? :P
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards
>>>>> Matthias
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sent from my phone, limitations might apply.
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> *From:* Hannes Tschofenig [hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net]
>>>>> *Received:* Tuesday, 07 Mar 2017, 19:39
>>>>> *To:* Michael Richardson [mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca]
>>>>> *CC:* t2trg@irtf.org [T2TRG@irtf.org]
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [T2TRG] RESTful Design & Security
>>>>>
>>>>> OSCOAP does not work when
>>>>>
>>>>> * you mix protocols,
>>>>> * use a middlebox for some processing interactions (such as data
>>>>> aggregation), and
>>>>> * when one of the protocols is a non-RESTful protocol, such as BLE
>>>> or MQTT.
>>>>> Unfortunately, these the use cases we are facing in current IoT
>>>>> deployments. For similar reasons we cannot use RFC 8075 either.
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe you are seeing different deployment environments.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ciao
>>>>> Hannes
>>>>>
>>>>> On 03/07/2017 06:39 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
>>>>>> Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
>>>>>>     > Needless to say that these challenges have also been
>>>>>> observed
>>>> in other
>>>>>>     > protocols as well, such as HTTP and even SIP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     > What is the story for providing application layer security?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OSCOAP seems to be end-to-end to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software
>>>>>> Works  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> T2TRG mailing list
>>>>> T2TRG@irtf.org
>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/t2trg
>>>>>
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