Re: [Taps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-03.txt

Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com> Sat, 27 October 2018 05:08 UTC

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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 22:07:47 -0700
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To: Aaron Falk <aafalk@akamai.com>
Cc: Theresa Enghardt <theresa@inet.tu-berlin.de>, draft-ietf-taps-transport-security@ietf.org, taps@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Taps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-03.txt
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Hi Aaron,

On Fri, Oct 26, 2018 at 10:46 AM Aaron Falk <aafalk@akamai.com> wrote:

> Dear Authors,
>
> We agreed at the last IETF that the authors would send a note when this
> draft was ready for SecDir review. Is it ready? Do you want to talk about
> Theresa's comments in Bangkok first?
>

It is not yet ready. We will send it to SecDir when that changes. I don’t
think Theresa’s comments are blockers here. (I’ll spin a new version with
her comments for submission when the tracker reopen.)

Best,
Chris


> --aaron
>
> On 26 Oct 2018, at 5:15, Theresa Enghardt wrote:
>
> Dear TAPS,
>
> having shepherded the minset draft, and, in the process, having seen a
> lot of discussion around security, where we mostly pointed to the
> security survey draft, I gave this draft another read in the current
> version, with a focus on Section 5.
>
> Thanks for the update, this document was a good read.
>
> However, I have some comments, which I'm sharing now rather than later,
> just in case there's anything which is better discussed in-person in
> Bangkok.
>
>
> Right now, the abstract states that this document is a survey of
> security protocols. I suggest to add text saying that the document also
> provides a minimal set of security features. Essentially, this document
> and minset together cover the "minimum requirements of a secure
> transport system".
>
>
> In Section 5, the document groups security features into mandatory and
> optional features, and states their transport dependency and application
> dependency. Application dependency, for me, relates to whether a feature
> is "functional", "optimizing", or "automatable" (in minset terminology).
> For example, if there is no application dependency, the feature is
> "automatable" and does not have to be exposed to the application. In
> contrast, a "function" feature needs to be exposed to the application.
>
> In Section 5.1, I am missing transport dependency and application
> dependency for the mandatory transport features. For example, I would be
> interested to know what is the minimum that the transport system needs
> to expose to the application for public-key based authentication?
>
> In Section 5.1, what is "unilateral responder authentication", which I
> haven't found in other places in the document under this name?
>
> In Section 5.2, "Session caching and management" has no application
> dependency. However, later in Section 6.1, we do expose Session Cache
> Management to the application. My interpretation is that this is just an
> "optimizing" feature, which is why there is no application dependency,
> but it is still useful to expose. It might help to make this explicit in
> the text.
>
> In Section 5, do we want to mention any security features related to
> integrity protection?
>
>
> As far as I can see, none of the protocols we survey provide any
> features explicitly providing privacy. Maybe this is worth highlighting
> in the Security considerations section, beyond saying that no claims of
> privacy properties are made.
>
>
> Finally, I would be in favor of asking for a Secdir early review to make
> sure we're not missing anything in the survey.
>
>
> Thank you again for this draft. I really appreciate that we're
> discussing transport security features in this way.
>
>
> Best,
> Theresa
>
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