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Re: [tcpinc] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-13: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Mon, 13 November 2017 21:24 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "Black, David" <David.Black@dell.com>, "tcpinc@ietf.org" <tcpinc@ietf.org>, Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>, "tcpinc-chairs@ietf.org" <tcpinc-chairs@ietf.org>, "Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)" <ietf@kuehlewind.net>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2017 13:24:00 -0800
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Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-13: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> writes:

> To be honest, I think this document is working too hard in both cases to
> try to legislate that people don't do things that we think are bad. The
> bottom
> line is that in both cases the boundaries around what we think is OK and
> what we think is not are kind of fuzzy (as you illustrate above with
> Curve25519). Rather than try to write RFC 2919 language about this,
> it would be better to simply describe the consequences of bad choices,
> and say that the function must be collision resistant, and stop.

I don't understand the RFC2919 reference.  Did you mean a different RFC,
or is there some IETF lore about this being an overly-specified RFC?

The thing is, there is definitely historical precedent for intentionally
choosing weak crypto algorithms.  And while I hope the truly bad old
days are behind us, I still think it's important that we abstract some
base level of security out of TCP-ENO so that most applications don't
need to whitelist TEP identifiers.

David

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