Re: [tcpinc] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: (with COMMENT)
Daniel B Giffin <dbg@scs.stanford.edu> Fri, 17 November 2017 06:31 UTC
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Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 22:31:50 -0800
From: Daniel B Giffin <dbg@scs.stanford.edu>
To: Benoit Claise <bclaise@cisco.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt@ietf.org, Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>, tcpinc-chairs@ietf.org, tcpinc@ietf.org, wangzitao@huawei.com
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Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: (with COMMENT)
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Benoit Claise wrote: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Nothing against the publication of this document but ... as for any > experimental RFCs, we must describe the criteria for a successful experiment > (evaluation)? Oh right! I've added this section: 9. Experiments Some experience will be required to determine whether the tcpcrypt protocol can be deployed safely and successfully across the diverse environments of the global internet. Safety means that TCP implementations that support tcpcrypt are able to communicate reliably in all the same settings as they would without tcpcrypt. As described in [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno] Section 9, this property can be subverted if middleboxes strip ENO options from non-SYN segments after allowing them in SYN segments; or if the particular communication patterns of tcpcrypt offend the policies of middleboxes doing deep-packet-inspection. Success, in addition to safety, means that hosts which implement tcpcrypt actually enable encryption when they connect to each other. This property depends on the network's treatment of the TCP-ENO handshake, and can be subverted if middleboxes merely strip unknown TCP options or if they terminate TCP connections and relay data back and forth unencrypted. Ease of implementation will be a further challenge to deployment. Because tcpcrypt requires encryption operations on frames that may span TCP segments, kernel implementations are forced to buffer segments in different ways than are necessary for plain TCP. More implementation experience will show how much additional code complexity is required in various operating systems, and what kind of performance effects can be expected.
- [tcpinc] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draft-ie… Benoit Claise
- Re: [tcpinc] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draf… Daniel B Giffin
- Re: [tcpinc] Benoit Claise's No Objection on draf… Benoit Claise