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Re: [tcpinc] Review of draft-bittau-tcpinc-tcpeno-01

David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Thu, 27 August 2015 16:13 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
To: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
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Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 09:13:47 -0700
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Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tcpinc <tcpinc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Review of draft-bittau-tcpinc-tcpeno-01
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Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> writes:

> Don't you need anyway an internal interface to say that tcp-eno has to
> set the "b" bit?
>
> That's simply saying to tcp-eno that this side will be the host A. Isn't this 
> sufficient? Or do I miss something?

You need both a local interface to set the role, and a bit on the wire
to verify that the remote application set is role compatibly.  Isn't
that the minimum necessary to break the symmetry of simultaneous open?
Anything less risks complete connection failure (not just fallback to
plaintext) when the tie is incorrectly broken.

David

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