Re: [tcpinc] Review of draft-bittau-tcpinc-tcpeno-01

[ianG <[e-mail]>]

On 23/08/2015 22:33 pm, David Mazieres wrote:
> Well, hypothetically, say the US prefers spec X and the EU prefers spec
> Y.  The goal is that two hosts in the US would always choose spec X and
> two hosts in the EU would always chose spec Y.  But when a host in the
> US communicates with a host in the EU, we don't really care as
> much--they could choose X or Y, so we might as well base it on the
> preferences of the passive opener.  However, hard-coding the spec
> rankings risks delaying standardization to argue over which specs should
> take priority.


Again, this argument doesn't apply to TCPINC.  If someone (anyone) 
specifies a certain algorithm at management level, they can and should 
use TLS.  And, that especially applies to the banks in Russia...

The notion that someone is both specifying TCPINC and specifying 
algorithm suite XXX appears too constructed to get much credence.



iang



ps; The argument doesn't apply generally either:

a. We here are far better placed to choose the Internet's crypto suite 
for the general case than any manager, committee, or sysadm.
b. If the Russians don't trust it, they are entirely at liberty to write 
their own crypto protocol and back-fit it into their software.  It's not 
that hard, and if they care - which they do for natsec - they'll be 
backfitting software anyway.
c. the deployment argument wins over for the banks.
d. Unlike the WB/IMF/UN, IETF isn't a subsidy organisation to deliver 
solutions to governments.  It delivers to the masses, not any particular 
squeaky wheel.
e.  etc...