[tcpinc] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-16: (with COMMENT)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 17 November 2017 07:16 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:16:05 -0800
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Subject: [tcpinc] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-16: (with COMMENT)
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Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-16: No Objection

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This is looking good. A few small comments:

   ENO provides a framework in which two endpoints can agree on a TCP
   encryption protocol or _TEP_ out of multiple possible TEPs.  For
   future compatibility, TEPs can vary widely in terms of wire format,
Nit: instead of "or _TEP_" I would say (_TEP_). These are the same thing

   suboptions, which we term a _vacuous_ SYN-form ENO option.  If either
   host sends a vacuous ENO option, it follows that there are no valid
   TEP identifiers for the connection and hence the connection MUST fall
do you mean "vacuous SYN-form ENO option' here?

                (1) A -> B:  SYN      ENO<a=0,X,Y>
                (2) B -> A:  SYN-ACK
Oh, I now see why you were sad. I meant *b=0*, so it makes clear why the roles
resolve properly. My bad.

I agree you don't need to show a=0 all the time. So sorry.