[tcpinc] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: (with COMMENT)

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Sat, 11 November 2017 06:32 UTC

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Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 22:32:37 -0800
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Subject: [tcpinc] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: (with COMMENT)
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Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: Yes

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COMMENT:
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In section 3.3, the last bullet: Why are the SHOULDs not MUSTs? Do you envision
times where it might make sense not refresh an ephemeral public key, or write
one to persistent storage?