[tcpinc] New TCP-ENO draft posted
David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Tue, 25 October 2016 09:38 UTC
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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
To: tcpinc <tcpinc@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2016 02:38:44 -0700
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Subject: [tcpinc] New TCP-ENO draft posted
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We just posted a new TCP-ENO draft in the usual place:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno/
We tried to reflect all of the discussion so far. In particular, a
bunch of SHOULDs are now MUSTs, and the remaining ones are coupled with
a clearer exception. If you don't have time to read the whole thing,
probably the places that could most use the most scrutiny are:
* 4.7 (Data in SYN segments) This went through a lot of churn after the
last meeting. I think we'd already addressed most of the issues on
the mailing list, but now we've actually incorporated the proposed
language into the draft, so it would be good to check that this
matches everyone's expectations.
* 5.0 (Requirements for TEPs) This is yet another attempt to finesse the
question of authenticating FIN and URG bits without "updating" RFC793.
In particular, URG is still part of TCP (RFC6093), but is neither
broadly used nor supported by TCP-use-TLS. So the goal is to make ENO
itself fine with TCP-use-TLS while steering clear of the broader
debate over how important URG is.
If we get feedback this week, we can probably iterate one more time
before the deadline. If at all possible, please try to anchor feedback
in proposed wording changes. I'm hoping we're at a point where we don't
need a lot of more abstract discussion.
Thanks,
David
- [tcpinc] New TCP-ENO draft posted David Mazieres