[tcpinc] New TCP-ENO draft

David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Fri, 20 October 2017 09:24 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
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Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 02:24:32 -0700
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Subject: [tcpinc] New TCP-ENO draft
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There's a new TCP-ENO draft in the usual place:


This draft addresses last call comments we received.  Other than some
typos, the main changes are to update the requirements language (section
1) to use RFC8174 and to add a new section 8.5.  Since 8.5 contains new
language, we'd appreciate other eyes on this paragraph (even just
comments saying "looks fine" would be helpful):

8.5.  Unpredictability of session IDs

   Section 5.1 specifies that all but the first (TEP identifier) byte of
   a session ID MUST be computationally indistinguishable from random
   bytes to a network eavesdropper.  This property is easy to ensure
   under standard assumptions about cryptographic hash functions.  Such
   unpredictability helps security in a broad range of cases.  For
   example, it makes it possible for applications to use a session ID
   from one connection to authenticate a session ID from another,
   thereby tying the two connections together.  If furthermore helps
   ensure that TEPs do not trivially subvert the 33-byte minimum length
   requirement for session IDs by padding shorter session IDs with