Re: [tcpm] SYN/ACK Payloads, draft 01

"Adam Langley" <agl@imperialviolet.org> Fri, 15 August 2008 14:57 UTC

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Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2008 07:57:49 -0700
From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
To: Anders Waldenborg <anders@0x63.nu>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] SYN/ACK Payloads, draft 01
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On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 4:09 AM, Anders Waldenborg <anders@0x63.nu> wrote:
> Doesn't SA payloads open up for DoS-amplification (attacker would send SYN
> packets to your SMTP server with spoofed source address to send more data to
> victim then would be possible by sending them directly to victim)?

It's certainly a consideration, which is why the draft recommended
that 64 bytes be the maximum payload size. At this size there are more
juicy targets for amplification, like DNS servers.


Cheers

AGL

-- 
Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org http://www.imperialviolet.org
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