Re: [tcpm] tcpsecure recommendations

> Anantha Ramaiah (ananth) wrote:
> ...
> |> If preventing anything that could cause a malicious teardown is 
> |> critical, then use of strict authentication is required.
> |> Implications to the contrary endorse the use of this "protocol 
> |> robustness" mechanism for true security (a misconception that the 
> |> title doesn't help abate).
> |
> | Agreed but again the above statement doesn't help in debate 
> which we 
> | are having, ie., the strength of the data mitigation. All 
> so far I can 
> | gather is that : somehow you are saying data mitigation is tied to 
> | "data plane" and the rest are tied to control plane and 
> hence in one 
> | case is a SHOULD and the other a MAY. Sounds very dubious to me.
> 
> My comments are not intended to convince you to agree with 
> me. I have made my decision, and explained it, IMO.

Well, I was seeking clarification on the reasoning which you gave for
your choice! IMO, esp. after the AS is in place, it doesn't make sense
to color each individual mitigation differently.

-Anantha
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