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Re: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?

Mark Allman <mallman@icir.org> Fri, 28 September 2007 18:18 UTC

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To: "Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com>
From: Mark Allman <mallman@icir.org>
Subject: Re: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?
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Anantha-

I have to say I am pretty drained from reading this thread and really
don't know if we have consensus on anything or are driving towards
developing it.

The one thing that really confuses me in this discussion is the
statements like this:

> Since, all these discussions about started due to TCP secure, let me
> use the same as an example. There is nothing wrong in making all
> mitigations SHOULD since the "very good reason" can be one of :-

It really seems to me that you are equating MAY and SHOULD.  It seems
like this is saying that implementers can come up with any reason to not
implement tcpsecure if we tag these with a SHOULD.  I think I understand
a number of other people's distinctions between MAY and SHOULD, but I
cannot figure out how you differentiate them and therefore I cannot
figure out why you think they ought to be SHOULD and not MAY.

allman




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