Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13.txt
Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Thu, 30 May 2013 16:53 UTC
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13.txt
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Hi, all, On 5/30/2013 7:28 AM, Scheffenegger, Richard wrote: > Thanks Pasi, Joe. > >> Even sending an ACK >> defeats that. At best, send a dup ack for last segment received correctly, >> but I still think that doing *anything* other than silent-drop isn't what >> PAWS protection intends. > > My understanding is, that failing the PAWS test should be treated like receiving > a segment that is out-of-window. The reason for failing the PAWS test (missing TSopt, > or invalid TSval) is secondary, not? > > Thus an ACK for the last in-sequence segment should be sent. > >> 1) MAY/SHOULD/MUST send response for missing timestamp > > This case is not currently covered. As consensus was reached that > TSopt should not be allowed to be sent arbitratily for some segments and > not for others, I would think a missing timestamp in a segment means, > that segment needs to be treated like any other out-of-window segment. Missing a timestamp is a bit different; it not only means that the segment should be treated as out-of-window, but there's something else amiss with the connection. I.e., out-of-window might be fixed at some point, but missing TSopt will never be fixed. So I don't see what the point of sending a response here would be - it's like sending the last-valid ACK when you get any other malformed packet (because malformed != expired timestamp) -- which we don't do. >> 2) MAY/SHOULD/MUST send response when timestamp comparison fails (current >> text on R1 seems to want that this is MUST) > > For both, I think a MUST would be a appropriate, a SHOULD may > suffice.(as an individual contributor). FWIW, I never like "SHOULD" unless we have an explicit reason for not selecting MUST - either a known exception (which we should mention), or a reason for wanting to keep the door open. In this case, I'm not sure what the appropriate behavior would be - what's the point of sending a response (e.g., an ACK of the last correctly received data) when the timestamp fails? I.e., I wouldn't send a message unless it provides a purpose. Does it here? Joe > > > Fixed the Nit, and updated section 6 as indicated. > > Best regards, > > Richard Scheffenegger > > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tcpm-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of >> Pasi Sarolahti >> Sent: Donnerstag, 30. Mai 2013 10:36 >> To: Joe Touch >> Cc: tcpm@ietf.org Extensions >> Subject: Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13.txt >> >> On May 29, 2013, at 11:07 PM, Joe Touch <touch@ISI.EDU> wrote: >> >>>> * PAWS algorithm tells to send acknowledgment if the check fails. >>>> Shouldn't we then, for consistency, require sending acknowledgment >>>> also if TSopt is missing? Current MAY in Sec. 3.2. is not very >>>> informative in my mind. >>> >>> I don't think it's useful to send the ACK in that case. The point of >> PAWS is to ignore segments that are not protected. Even sending an ACK >> defeats that. At best, send a dup ack for last segment received correctly, >> but I still think that doing *anything* other than silent-drop isn't what >> PAWS protection intends. >> >> The PAWS algorithm motivates sending ACK with recovering from half-open >> connections (referring to fig. 10 in RFC 793), when one side crashes and >> re-opens the connection. Wouldn't this same reasoning apply also for >> missing timestamps case? It is possible that after a reboot the system >> timestamps setting is reset from enabled to disabled, if that happens to >> be the boot-time default. In such case the newly opening connection would >> have its segments discarded by the other side that still remains in >> established state, because of lack of timestamps, isn't that right? >> >> Admittedly this is not the most likely scenario, but just trying to dig up >> the reasoning for choosing one way or the other. >> >> Since we are on the path of clarifying the text with normative language, >> why not do the same also for Section 4.3? We should decide >> >> 1) MAY/SHOULD/MUST send response for missing timestamp >> >> 2) MAY/SHOULD/MUST send response when timestamp comparison fails (current >> text on R1 seems to want that this is MUST) >> >> It would be good to provide these with some reasoning, too. For (2) this >> reasoning already seems to be in place. >> >> Nit: start of section 4.3 uses "REQUIRES" that should not be capitalized >> because it is not a RFC 2119 keyword. How about just saying something like >> "if PAWS algorithm is enabled, the following steps MUST be followed", or >> something. Sorry about splitting hairs, but I think we should be pedantic >> about the keywords. >> >>>> " * If the Timestamps option is removed from the <SYN> or <SYN,ACK> >>>> segment, high speed connections that need PAWS would not >>>> have that protection. Successful negotiation of Timestamps option >>>> enforces a stricter verification of incoming segments at receiver. If >>>> the Timestamps option was removed from a subsequent data segment >>>> after a successful negotiation (for example, as part of >>>> re-segmentation), the segment is discarded by the receiver without >>>> further processing. Middleboxes should not remove the Timestamps >>>> option. One study found that 6% of measured HTTP connections had the >>>> Timestamps option removed from data segments [Honda11]." >>> >>> The last sentence seems out of place; why are you including that? If >> there are implications to the 6% drop then you should mention that, but I >> would expect that elsewhere than the security considerations section. >> >> Because that paragraph talks about removal of timestamps option. But I >> agree that the proposed sentence doesn't sit there very well. How about >> including the reference in the beginning of the Middleboxes section of the >> text: >> >> "Some middleboxes have been known to remove the TCP options >> described in this document from the TCP segments [Honda11]." >> (changed <SYN> segment to TCP segments) >> >> The main point is that the current text only talks about dropping options >> from SYN segments, but this happens also for data segments, as the paper >> shows. Since we have fairly recent quantified data about this, why not >> include the reference? >> >> - Pasi >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tcpm mailing list >> tcpm@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm
- [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13.txt internet-drafts
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Yuchung Cheng
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Yuchung Cheng
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Olivier Bonaventure
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Yuchung Cheng
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Christoph Paasch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… l.wood
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Fernando Gont
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Tim Shepard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Andre Oppermann
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Yuchung Cheng
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Jakob Heitz
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Pasi Sarolahti
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-13… Joe Touch