[tcpm] Separate header checksums and WiFi

Michael Welzl <michael.welzl@uibk.ac.at> Wed, 31 January 2007 15:14 UTC

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Subject: [tcpm] Separate header checksums and WiFi
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Dear all,

A long time ago, at the San Diego IETF meeting in August 2004,
I presented an idea called "Corruption Notification Options"
(a proposal which is some sort of a refined specification of
the TCP HACK idea) to this group.

The group's feedback was that this is useless, as errors
occur in such a clustered fashion that you wouldn't see
any packets with an intact header but erroneous payload
(which is the only situation where the scheme would
yield any benefit). I think that it was Gorry Fairhurst
who said this.

I figured that the only convincing way to prove him
wrong is to actually do a real-life test. I did, and
proved him right  :)  that is, disabling checksums for
parts of packets doesn't yield much of a benefit in
WiFi networks, where it seems that frames are delivered
in an all-or-nothing fashion.

Doing this test requires patching the device driver (to
disable the link layer CRC), and above all, finding a good
student - all of this took quite some time, but now it's
over, and the documentation can be found at:
http://www.welzl.at/research/projects/corruption/
(bottom of the page)

I learned my lesson, and thought I'd share it with you -
but this result only concerns WiFi. I'll keep this as a
low-priority "background" project and may take a closer
look at other link layers one day... in any case, that
topic still interests me, and I can't believe that it
wouldn't be possible to get a benefit out of such a scheme.


I'm sending this note to TCPM, TSVWG and DCCP because there
are similar mechanisms there (DCCP: the Data Checksum option; SCTP:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-stewart-sctp-pktdrprep-06.txt
although I just noticed that this is apparently not a WG item...
still, it's SCTP related).

This note also goes to ICCRG, because I think that this should
be the place for related discussions (in fact Lachlan Andrew
will give us a related talk at our upcoming meeting:
http://www1.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/wiki/Agenda )


Cheers,
Michael


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