Re: [tcpm] Comments on TCP-AO Draft

inline again...

At 05:28 PM 11/17/2008, Gregory M. Lebovitz wrote:
>inline...
>
>At 12:06 PM 11/17/2008, Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-RCN0)[VZ] wrote:
>> >-----Original Message-----
>> >From: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tcpm-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> >Behalf Of LANGE Andrew
>> >Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 1:51 PM
>> >To: tcpm@ietf.org
>> >Subject: [tcpm] Comments on TCP-AO Draft
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>There are a lot of good comments here that will strengthen
>>the document.  One of them that concerns the wire-format rather
>>than text additions, clarifications, and changes that are
>>needed, which we should address quickly is:
>>
>>
>> >1.4.1: " IETF-72 topic" sections "No current consensus was
>> >reached on this topic, so no change was made."  This is a real
>> >problem -- the logic is deeply flawed.  Allow me to restate:
>> >One author of this document has appointed themselves the
>> >arbiter of consensus.  This author disagrees with other
>> >people, and therefore no "consensus" can ever be reached, so
>> >the default case this author has chosen is to keep things they
>> >way they like it.
>> >
>> > ...
>> >
>> >"..omit an explicit algorithm ID..." -- I've said this before,
>> >this is a BAD IDEA^tm. The protocol utility of doing this is
>> >minimal (1-bit increase in search space), and the operational
>> >complexity goes up.  Not to mention, it makes it operationally
>> >incompatible with existing implementations.

BTW, in the reference above, in the newly posted
     <http://tools.ietf.org/html/./draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-02>draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-02
this comment regards section 1.3.1, not 1.4.1.
Hope it helps,
Gregory.

>>There was logic given to support each side of the argument.  My
>>understanding of the summary for each position is:
>>
>>(position 1 - "include") Including information like algorithm ID
>>and k-bit is BAD because it aids in debugging of implementations
>>and of configurations.
>
>Wes, did you mean to say "GOOD" instead of "BAD" in this paragraph? 
>I'll assume yes.
>
>
>>(position 2 - "don't include") Including this information is BAD
>>because it can expose information about the security parameters.
>>It doesn't aid in debugging of configuration because operators still
>>have to call each other in order to read off and verify keys.
>>
>>There seemed to be more people around position 2 than position 1,
>>but we should flag this and ask during the meeting, as well as
>>open this up on the mailing list to see what people prefer.  We
>>need to pick one and move on.
>
>I concur with your recollection about the two positions above. I 
>also concur with your recollection that there was more people (not 
>100% consensus, but more) around Position 2 than 1. The argument I 
>made went something like this, and was based on lots of years of 
>debugging interop issues in both IKEv1/ESP and IKEv2/ESP:
>  - there is only the case where the connection will be discussed 
> out of band by system admins before a first connection is made. At 
> that point, there will be some agreement about config choices.
>  - if the connection doesn't work, you double check your config 
> matches your agreement of config choices.
>  - if the config matches the agreement, then you can try the other 
> algo, just in case you misheard that part.
>  - if it doesn't work, then you have to pick up the phone and call 
> the other guy to double check config parameters.
>  Conclusion: having the bits on the wire about the config elements 
> doesn't help practically, and contradicts the basic security 
> principle of hiding as much about the SA as possible.
>
>So I am also support Position 2.
>
>Gregory.
>
>
>>As an individual, and not a co-chair, I'm in the position 2 "don't
>>include" camp.
>>
>>
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