[tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-10.txt

Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Wed, 09 July 2008 07:30 UTC

Return-Path: <tcpm-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: tcpm-archive@megatron.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-tcpm-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [] (localhost []) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 291C63A6935; Wed, 9 Jul 2008 00:30:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Original-To: tcpm@ietf.org
Delivered-To: tcpm@core3.amsl.com
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id A93823A683D; Wed, 9 Jul 2008 00:30:01 -0700 (PDT)
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <20080709073001.A93823A683D@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2008 00:30:01 -0700
Cc: tcpm@ietf.org
Subject: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-10.txt
X-BeenThere: tcpm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions Working Group <tcpm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm>, <mailto:tcpm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/private/tcpm>
List-Post: <mailto:tcpm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tcpm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm>, <mailto:tcpm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Sender: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks
	Author(s)       : A. Ramaiah, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-10.txt
	Pages           : 27
	Date            : 2008-07-09

TCP has historically been considered protected against spoofed off-
path packet injection attacks by relying on the fact that it is
difficult to guess the 4-tuple (the source and destination IP
addresses and the source and destination ports) in combination with
the 32 bit sequence number(s).  A combination of increasing window
sizes and applications using longer term connections (e.g.  H-323 or
Border Gateway Protocol [RFC4271]) have left modern TCP
implementations more vulnerable to these types of spoofed packet
injection attacks.

Many of these long term TCP applications tend to have predictable IP
addresses and ports which makes it far easier for the 4-tuple to be
guessed.  Having guessed the 4-tuple correctly, an attacker can
inject a RST, SYN or DATA segment into a TCP connection by
systematically guessing the sequence number of the spoofed segment to
be in the current receive window.  This can cause the connection to
either abort or possibly cause data corruption.  This document
specifies small modifications to the way TCP handles inbound segments
that can reduce the chances of a successful attack.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
tcpm mailing list