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Re: [tcpm] tcpsecure recommendations

"Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com> Sun, 10 February 2008 17:38 UTC

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From: "Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com>
To: Joe Touch <touch@ISI.EDU>, mallman@icir.org
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] tcpsecure recommendations
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> 
> #3 makes most sense tm oe. #1 weakens the AS statement too 
> much, and 
> #2 covers data plane protection that there are too 
> many other ways to spoof (overwriting segments, or just 
> writing segments with predicted header data). This appears to 
> be best applied to an unauthenticated control plane.

I am assuming you are characterizing the reception of certain segments
like SYN/RST/FIN as control plane and pure data as otherwise?. Pl note
that tcp-secure mainly talks about injecting a bad segment which
eventually results in tearing down an established TCP connection. In
other words, I can't understand your reasoning for not going with #2.
What do you think are the issues going with #2 ?

Can you elaborate?

-Anantha
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