Re: [tcpm] tcp-auth-opt issue: replay protection

"Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-RCN0)[VZ]" <wesley.m.eddy@nasa.gov> Wed, 06 August 2008 15:11 UTC

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Thread-Topic: [tcpm] tcp-auth-opt issue: replay protection
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From: "Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-RCN0)[VZ]" <wesley.m.eddy@nasa.gov>
To: Joe Touch <touch@ISI.EDU>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Aug 2008 15:12:06.0880 (UTC) FILETIME=[CA476E00:01C8F7D6]
Cc: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>, tcpm@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [tcpm] tcp-auth-opt issue: replay protection
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>-----Original Message-----
>From: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tcpm-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>Behalf Of Joe Touch
>Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2008 11:04 AM
>To: Eric Rescorla
>
>Eric Rescorla wrote:
>| At Wed, 6 Aug 2008 14:32:02 +0300,
>| Lars Eggert wrote:
>|> On 2008-8-1, at 21:44, ext Joe Touch wrote:
>|>> IMO: retransmitted packets would use the currently active keyID
>|>> (even if
>|>> different from what was previously transmitted).
>|> I agree. TCP retransmits previous data, not previous segments.
>|
>| I agree it should be permissible to use the new key-id, but
>| should it be required? I don't know a lot about
>| TCP stack implementations, but do any of them currently save
>| existing packets and just retransmit them? That's legal, right?
>| If so, this would break that.
>
><indiv hat on>
>Does anyone know what happens to other options? I.e., aren't timestamps
>recomputed, SACK options recalculated, etc.? It seems like the options
>need to be revisited when a segment goes out the door anyway, and a
>stack that just replays segments is what might be considered 
>"broken"...


I think you're 100% correct in assuming the options are recreated for
retransmissions.  The only stacks I've seen that store segments in
order to do a retransmission are oddball ones for teeny-tiny systems,
and they don't do any TCP options in those stacks anyways, so they
definitely would not be concerned with the Auth Option.
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