Re: [tcpm] Review of draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-01

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Eric Rescorla wrote:
| At Mon, 28 Jul 2008 10:52:09 -0700,
| Joe Touch wrote:
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|> Eric Rescorla wrote:
|> ...
|> |> having a per-message counter is probably too much additional work.
|> |> Having a "pseudo" extended sequence number is very little work
|> |> (really, I've already implemented it) and that mean that we don't have
|> |> to rekey faster than the 32-bit sequence rollover. However, the
|> |> rekeying isn't all that painful anyway.
|> |
|> | It depends what you mean by rekeying. If it involves a new protocol
|> | exchange it is incredibly painful. If you mean just running the kdf
|> | again, I agree that's fine.
|>
|> Both ends' key mgt systems can run the kdf again and this should work
|> fine. No need for on-the-wire exchanges, but no need to bury this into
|> TCP-AO IMO either.
|
| Well, it needs to be used with TCP-AO regardless of which
| integrity algorithm is used. Why wouldn't we want to
| "bury" that in TCP-AO?

The point of the split of TCP-AO and the key system was to leave the
latter in the hands of SAAG. Since the key system MUST be used with
TCP-AO, it's all part of the solution anyway.

Joe
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