[tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?

Mark Allman <mallman@icir.org> Mon, 24 September 2007 17:45 UTC

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From: Mark Allman <mallman@icir.org>
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Subject: [tcpm] tcpsecure: how strong to recommend?
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Folks-

The seeming last issue with the tcpsecure document is how strong to
recommend the various mitigations.  To review, there are three
mitigations for RST, SYN and data injection attacks.  The question is
whether to say that a TCP (1) MAY use all these mitigations, (2) SHOULD
use all these mitigations or (3) SHOULD use the mitigations for the RST
& SYN attacks and MAY use the data injection mitigation.  Clearly there
are other permutations (and one could also bring MUST and MUST NOT into
the conversation), however these three options have been voiced.  If you
have some other permutation then voice it.

In the meeting in Chicago we took a "visual hum" and the tally looks
like this:

      all SHOULDs: 4
      all MAYs: 3
      two SHOULDs and a MAY: 8

So, our inclination is to go with option (3) from my list above.  If you
think this is the wrong way to go please yell---especially if you are
not reflected in the 15 folks who took part in the visual hum.

Thanks,
allman



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