Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.txt
"Scheffenegger, Richard" <rs.ietf@gmx.at> Sat, 05 February 2022 12:02 UTC
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To: Vidhi Goel <vidhi_goel=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net>
Cc: Richard Scheffenegger <rscheff@gmx.at>, "tcpm@ietf.org Extensions" <tcpm@ietf.org>, Mirja Kuehlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
References: <164389942954.13556.7754569279919863072@ietfa.amsl.com> <c2c5bdf9-6b34-fe19-3296-5f1cd831ed8e@bobbriscoe.net> <2FB9199D-4D31-418B-81DE-2E2D4358DEF6@apple.com> <e57355ae-5a9d-0a14-9478-29453d25622c@bobbriscoe.net> <BB23E172-C995-41FE-A47E-E02D5586B67D@apple.com>
From: "Scheffenegger, Richard" <rs.ietf@gmx.at>
In-Reply-To: <BB23E172-C995-41FE-A47E-E02D5586B67D@apple.com>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.txt
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Vidhi, Thanks for reading the draft very closely! Well, in the non-ECT SYN case, where the SYNACK indicates an ECT (ect0, ect1, ce) is the obvious - and fully semantically correct - use case of that possible use. For the set of three codepoints (ECT0, ECT1, CE) the only other possible valid detection scenario would be if a SYN+CE is sent (deliberately, althought one can argue that a sender should not originate CE-marked packets), but a SYNACK without CE is returned (full or partial bleaching). At least under the current RFC3168 definition of IP ECN codepoints. allowed transitions: nonECT -> nonECT ECT0 -> ECT0 ECT0 -> ECT1 ECT0 -> CE ECT1 -> ECT1 ECT1 -> ECT0 (possibly) ECT1 -> CE CE -> CE Thinking about this aspect more, I am now unsure, if the higher level functions, such as detection of IP ECN codepoint mangling, or validating across multiple RTTs, should be in this document - or not rather be in a separate draft, in order to facilitate independent implementation and improvement of mechanisms in that space. However, the above table of allowed IP ECN transistions may be updated independently of AccECN - and performing extensive checks as part of a signal protocol ossifies this IMHO. As a middle ground, perhaps having these descriptions in a non-normative section, clearly stating these to be examples of what an impemented could choose to do? Richard Am 05.02.2022 um 02:14 schrieb Vidhi Goel: > I like your response for all the points. I can review the diff for the > proposed changes, if you’d like before committing them to the draft. > > Sorry, I want to add a new comment for this text, > > If a TCP client has set the SYN to Not-ECT, but > receives feedback that the IP-ECN field on the SYN arrived with a > different codepoint, it can detect such middlebox interference and > send Not-ECT for the rest of the connection. > > > This statement holds good for Not-ECT but doesn’t if lets say the SYN > was ECT0 or ECT1 as those could be marked CE and still be valid. Should > we add a statement for ECT marked SYN as well? > > Thanks, > Vidhi > >> On Feb 4, 2022, at 5:44 AM, Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net >> <mailto:ietf@bobbriscoe.net>> wrote: >> >> Vidhi, >> >> I've increased the table of contents to tocdepth = "4" which might >> help find the relevant sections better, because a lot of the meat in >> this draft is under sections 3.2.2 (ACE) and 3.2.3 (Option). >> >> I've responded below, but I'd prefer it if you would say these things >> on the list, so we have a better justification for changing the draft. >> Reviewing a draft that has just be re-posted shouldn't imply anything >> about whether Apple is implementing the draft or not. >> >> (BTW, regarding the proposed change to the initial value of r.e1b, I >> was going to send that to the list once co-authors agreed to it. But >> it would be nice if some of the edits were not self-generated.) >> >> See [BB] inline for responses (which I'll repeat if you send to the list). >> >> On 04/02/2022 07:37, Vidhi Goel wrote: >>> Hello Bob and authors, >>> >>> I have read the draft a few times and will send my extensive review >>> at a later point. But right now, I want to ask some critical things >>> that an implementation could benefit from. >>> >>> The draft says, >>> /If a TCP client has set the SYN to Not-ECT, but/ >>> / receives feedback that the IP-ECN field on the SYN arrived with a/ >>> / different codepoint, it can detect such middlebox interference and/ >>> / send Not-ECT for the rest of the connection/ >>> >>> 1. On the forward path from client to server, the client will revert >>> to Not-ECT when it sees for example, that it sent a Non-ECT SYN but >>> received ACE encoding other than 0 1 0. What does the client do in >>> the last ACK of the 3WHS - >>> a. does it stay in AccECN mode and still send AccECN encoding based >>> on the IP code point of SYN-ACK (Table 4)? This would mean that >>> client won’t participate in ECN on the sender half of the connection >>> and only provide AccECN feedback to the server as a receiver. >>> b. does it disable AccECN mode and set ACE= 0 0 0 so that a server >>> in AccECN mode can disable ECN based on Table4? >>> >>> While writing this, I realized that the intention is probably a. >>> Could you confirm? Also, when the sender sets Not-ECT in its data >>> packets, it should also disable acting upon any ACE feedback as we >>> could still receive false ACE feedback from the server if the >>> network, lets say, changed 00 (not ECT) to 01(ECT1). If you agree, we >>> should add some text around this. Based on the current text, the >>> sender will always respond to the ACE feedback even if it sends Not-ECT. >>> >>> TBH, this is a complicated scenario, where sender said to the network >>> - I don’t trust you so I can’t use ECN. Feel free to drop my packets. >>> And the network mangles the IP to ECT1 and then set CE (when >>> congested) which would be feedback’ed from the receiver. Now, the >>> packet wasn’t dropped which it should have been. So, is it better to >>> just ignore this feedback because sender doesn’t trust the network or >>> just act on it and reduce cwnd in order to reduce congestion in the >>> network somewhere. >> >> [BB] Your points are all good ones. >> I'll address this last complex scenario first, because it has >> implications for the earlier questions. First I'll define some >> terminology: >> >> Simple mangling scenario: >> >> * some network function, e.g. broken Diffserv ToS-byte remarking, >> illegally remarks a Not-ECT SYN to CE. >> >> Your complex mangling scenario, repeated here: >> >> * some network function, e.g. broken Diffserv ToS-byte remarking, >> illegally remarks a Not-ECT SYN to ECT0 or ECT1, >> * then congestion at a subsequent bottleneck is marking some packets CE >> >> Then potentially the client could tailor its behaviour after sending a >> Not-ECT SYN, If the SYN/ACK feedback is >> >> 1. ECT: disable sending ECT, but continue responding to ECN feedback >> 2. CE, disable sending ECT, and disable response to ECN feedback >> >> However, this is uncertain, because CE feedback on the SYN/ACK could >> indicate either the simple or the complex mangling scenario. >> >> A simpler alternative would be to always continue responding to ECN >> feedback. Rationale: >> >> * Whether case #1 or #2, assume that mangling of the SYN might have >> been Not-ECT to ECT, even if the feedback off the SYN is CE. >> * Then as the connection progresses, if /all/ feedback is CE, >> there's already a recommendation to fall-back to disabling >> congestion response. >> >> If we do this, I think we ought to say "SHOULD continue to respond to >> ECN feedback", not "MUST". >> >> And we'll need to put this all to the WG. >> >> 1.a) Now back to the beginning of your point. The text you quote is >> from §2.5 which is in the non-normative "Overview and Rationale" >> section (§2). >> You really need the normative text from: >> >> >> 3.2.2.3. >> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.html#section-3.2.2.3>Testing >> for Mangling of the IP/ECN Field >> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.html#name-testing-for-mangling-of-the> >> >> >> where it says (end of 1st para): >> >> " ...for the remainder of the connection the client MUST NOT send >> ECN-capable packets, but it MUST continue to feed back any ECN >> markings on arriving packets." >> >> So, you're right, the answer is (a). >> It can't be (b), because, once in AccECN mode, 000 on the ACE field >> just becomes a counter value, and no longer negotiates the feedback mode. >> >> 1.b) As per the above, let's conservatively assume complex mangling. >> So, at the end of the first para quoted above I suggest we add: >> >> " ...for the remainder of the connection the client MUST NOT send >> ECN-capable packets *but**it**SHOULD continue to respond to ECN >> feedback even though **it **is no longer sending ECN-capable >> packets (see reasoning below)**. T**he client**MUST remain in the >> same feedback mode and***it MUST continue to feed back any ECN >> markings on arriving packets." >> >> I'll do the same for next para about the server. >> I'll work out some text for the reasoning, but I won't give it here. >> >> There are two other cases where it disables sending ECT, which don't >> say whether it continues to respond to congestion: >> >> * "Testing for Mangling" section, penultimate para, where it's >> receiving solid CE: >> "Once a Data Sender has entered AccECN mode it SHOULD check >> whether all feedback received for the first three or four rounds >> indicated that every packet it sent was CE-marked. If so, for the >> remainder of the connection, the Data Sender SHOULD NOT send >> ECN-capable packets*and it SHOULD NOT respond to ECN feedback*, >> but *it MUST remain in the same feedback mode and *it MUST >> continue to feed back any ECN markings on arriving packets*(in its >> role as Data Receiver)*." >> * Next section "Zeroing of the ACE Field", 2nd para: >> "If the value of this ACE field is zero (0b000), the Data Sender >> disables sending ECN-capable packets for the remainder of the >> half-connection by setting the IP/ECN field in all subsequent >> packets to Not-ECT, *but**it**SHOULD continue to respond to ECN >> feedback even though **it **is no longer sending ECN-capable >> packets.* *It MUST also remain in the same feedback mode and it >> MUST continue to feed back any ECN markings on arriving packets >> (in its role as Data Receiver).*" >> >> I'll also add reasoning (in the zeroing section, it already says that >> ACE=0b000 is not an unambiguous indication of mangling). >> >> And this prompts me to edit the bullet in an earlier section about the >> obligation of a sender to respond to congestion feedback: >> >> >> 3.1.5. >> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.html#section-3.1.5>Implications >> of AccECN Mode >> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.html#name-implications-of-accecn-mode> >> >> >> "It is still obliged to respond appropriately to AccECN feedback >> that indicates there were ECN marks on *ECN-capable *packets it >> had previously sent." >> >> And I'll add a bullet: >> >> "*If the sender chooses not to send ECN-capable packets (e.g. >> because path traversal of the ECN field is suspect), it can ignore >> any **ECN **feedback about those packets if it is certain that it >> cannot be valid (see Section 3.2.2, which gives normative >> requirements for certain specific cases).*" >> >> I've said 'can' rather than 'MUST' because it's hard to cover all >> cases, e.g. single packets without ECT when it's not clear whether the >> feedback covered another packet that was ECT. >> >> How does all this sound? >> >>> 2. On the reverse path from server to client, if a server sends a >>> Not-ECT SYN-ACK and receives ACE handshake encoding on last ACK other >>> than 0 1 0, there is no text like above that says server should send >>> Not-ECT for the rest of the connection (or at least I didn’t find >>> it). I think the server should also do same as client as the two >>> paths could be different. One could make it more complicated by >>> saying, if both client and server decide to not use ECN on their >>> corresponding sender half, then ECN should be disabled but let’s talk >>> about that later. >> >> [BB] It's in the second para of: >> >> >> 3.2.2.3. >> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.html#section-3.2.2.3>Testing >> for Mangling of the IP/ECN Field >> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.html#name-testing-for-mangling-of-the> >> >> >>> 3. In general, not setting the ECT (ECT0 or ECT1) code point on an >>> outgoing packet is different from supporting AccECN right as in the >>> host can still provide AccECN feedback on the receive path. >> >> [BB] Yup. >> >> Do you think any further explanation is needed in the above sections? >> >> >> Bob >> >>> …. >>> >>> To be continued if more questions come to my mind. >>> >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Vidhi >>> >>>> On Feb 3, 2022, at 7:24 AM, Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> tcpm folks, >>>> >>>> This rev to accurate-ecn is the first of two. The second will >>>> hopefully follow on its heels in the next couple of days. >>>> >>>> Diffs between this first rev (-16) and -15: >>>> >>>> 1. switches round two fairly large sections, so I've deferred other >>>> changes to a second rev so the diffs won't be masked by the switch >>>> round of sections. >>>> Suggested by Ilpo to match the order in which the tests in these >>>> sections will be executed: >>>> * Test for mangling the IP-ECN field (now 3.2.2.3), >>>> * Then test for zeroing the ACE field (now 3.2.2.4). >>>> >>>> 2. Ilpo suggested some clarifications in "3.2.3.2.5. Consistency >>>> between AccECN Feedback Fields", which is about the receiver of >>>> feedback ensuring consistency between the mandatory 3-bit ACE field >>>> and the optional 24-bit counters. In brief (paraphrasing) it >>>> previously only said "MUST consider both fields", when it is now >>>> clearer that it actually meant "MUST reconcile both fields", so that >>>> there is always a consistent baseline for subsequent ACKs. >>>> >>>> 3. A minor point is added in an appendix about the details that the >>>> pseudocode doesn't cover. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bob >>>> >>>> PS. #2 & #3 were added to the XML ages ago (Jul '21), so you will >>>> have seen them in the HTML. However, prob due to my clumsiness, the >>>> posted TXT didn't include them whereas the posted XML did (ironic >>>> for a section about consistency). In turn, inconsistency was only >>>> possible because I am having to manually post the TXT for this >>>> draft, due to an unresolved issue with v3 RFC XML tables. >>>> >>>> >>>> On 03/02/2022 14:43, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote: >>>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >>>>> directories. >>>>> This draft is a work item of the TCP Maintenance and Minor >>>>> Extensions WG of the IETF. >>>>> >>>>> Title : More Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP >>>>> Authors : Bob Briscoe >>>>> Mirja Kühlewind >>>>> Richard Scheffenegger >>>>> Filename : draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16.txt >>>>> Pages : 60 >>>>> Date : 2022-02-03 >>>>> >>>>> Abstract: >>>>> Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is a mechanism where network >>>>> nodes can mark IP packets instead of dropping them to indicate >>>>> incipient congestion to the end-points. Receivers with an ECN- >>>>> capable transport protocol feed back this information to the sender. >>>>> ECN was originally specified for TCP in such a way that only one >>>>> feedback signal can be transmitted per Round-Trip Time (RTT). >>>>> Recent >>>>> new TCP mechanisms like Congestion Exposure (ConEx), Data Center TCP >>>>> (DCTCP) or Low Latency Low Loss Scalable Throughput (L4S) need more >>>>> accurate ECN feedback information whenever more than one marking is >>>>> received in one RTT. This document specifies a scheme to provide >>>>> more than one feedback signal per RTT in the TCP header. Given TCP >>>>> header space is scarce, it allocates a reserved header bit >>>>> previously >>>>> assigned to the ECN-Nonce. It also overloads the two existing ECN >>>>> flags in the TCP header. The resulting extra space is exploited to >>>>> feed back the IP-ECN field received during the 3-way handshake as >>>>> well. Supplementary feedback information can optionally be provided >>>>> in a new TCP option, which is never used on the TCP SYN. The >>>>> document also specifies the treatment of this updated TCP wire >>>>> protocol by middleboxes. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: >>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn/ >>>>> >>>>> There is also an htmlized version available at: >>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16 >>>>> >>>>> A diff from the previous version is available at: >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-16 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org >>>>> <http://rsync.ietf.org>::internet-drafts >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> tcpm mailing list >>>>> tcpm@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ________________________________________________________________ >>>> Bob Briscoe http://bobbriscoe.net/ >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tcpm mailing list >>>> tcpm@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm >>> >> >> -- >> ________________________________________________________________ >> Bob Briscoehttp://bobbriscoe.net/ > > > _______________________________________________ > tcpm mailing list > tcpm@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm
- [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-1… internet-drafts
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Bob Briscoe
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Vidhi Goel
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Bob Briscoe
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Vidhi Goel
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Vidhi Goel
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Bob Briscoe
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-e… Bob Briscoe